

BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM

RELIEF PROGRAMME

July to December 2002

Including

Revised funding appeal for 2003

February 2003

BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM GOAL, AIM AND OBJECTIVES

PREAMBLE

The Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) is a consortium of humanitarian agencies developed from a consortium of Christian agencies (The Consortium of Christian Agencies) established in 1984 to provide basic food and relief supplies to 9,000 refugees from Burma along the Thailand/Burma border. The refugee population has increased considerably since that time and the BBC and other NGOs have expanded their programmes to meet their needs.

Members of the Consortium believe that all possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity, and that civilians so affected have a right to protection and assistance. It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in international humanitarian law and based on principles of humanity, that the members of the BBC offer their services as humanitarian agencies. The BBC will act in accordance with the principles set out in the "Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster relief (1994)"

GOAL

To alleviate the suffering of the displaced people from Burma brought about by the ongoing conflict.

AIM

To alleviate malnutrition and food insecurity and meet the primary physical needs for survival of women, men and children, in partnership with their community

OBJECTIVES

- To ensure that displaced persons will receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life.
- To ensure that the displaced will receive adequate shelter, cooking fuel and basic relief items.
- To ensure that a representative cross-section of the population (gender, religion, ethnicity) will participate in design and implementation of the programme.
- To coordinate all activities with other service providers.
- To minimise any adverse effects which the presence of refugees might have on Thai communities.

ACTIVITIES

The specific activities that are undertaken to meet BBC programme objectives vary from year to year in response to the displaced situation and services provided by other organisations.

POLICIES AND GUIDING PHILOSOPHY

NATURE OF ASSISTANCE

- To ensure whenever possible the same level of support to all displaced persons regardless of location, ethnicity or religion.
- To provide assistance to the displaced comparable with, and not exceeding the living standards of local communities.
- To improve Food Security (the availability, access and utilisation of food production capability) wherever possible.

DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE

- To keep staff presence and relief assistance to a minimum in order to respect cultural identity, promote self-sufficiency and minimise aid-dependency.
- To provide assistance through representative refugee relief committees to ensure coordination, to avoid duplication and to enhance the capacity of community leadership structures.

CO-ORDINATION

- To provide assistance in cooperation with the Royal Thai Government and in accordance with the regulations of the Ministry of Interior (MOI).
- To coordinate activities with agencies that provide health and education assistance through the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) and to support these activities where appropriate.
- To work as a consortium to avoid competition and duplication of assistance between agencies and to maximise access to and use of all member resources.

GENDER

- To increase understanding and practice of gender equality within BBC's organisation and the relief programme through the implementation of a gender policy. (See v) Appendix D)

EVALUATION AND INDICATORS

- To evaluate the programme periodically as a tool for improving the effectiveness of the programme and in accordance with donor requirements.
- To assess achievement of the programme goal, aim and objectives using appropriate indicators.

PHASE-OUT

- The BBC will assist the Royal Thai Government, Burmese authorities and International Organisations in the voluntary repatriation of refugees to Burma as appropriate and when the situation allows.
- The BBC will be dissolved when these goal, aim and objectives become invalid because there is no longer a need for assistance along the Thailand/Burma border or when another organisation takes over the responsibilities of BBC.

RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

- The attainment of these goal and objectives might be influenced (positively or negatively) by external factors beyond BBC's control. The presence or absence of epidemics, for example, could have a dramatic effect on the nutritional status of the population. Similarly, the policy of the Royal Thai Government towards displaced persons will have an important effect on the accessibility and level of services that can be provided. Other important factors which may influence BBC's ability to achieve its goal and objectives are Donor commitment to funding the BBC programme, the number of new refugee arrivals, foreign exchange rates and the price of commodities supplied by the BBC each year.

This is a revision of the Goal and Objectives agreed at the BBC Donors Meeting in September 2000. The key components were presented and agreed at the Donors Meeting in October 2002 but this revision has yet to be ratified.

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1. SUMMARY AND FUNDING APPEAL

This report describes the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) Refugee Relief Programme during the second six months of 2002 and presents a revised appeal for **USD 16.6 million** for 2003.

The total BBC caseload was 144,358 at the end of the December, only 1,132 higher than at the mid-year point. This was partly due to a downward revision of the Mon resettlement site figures across the border, but the increase in camps in Thailand was still only 2,469, or 411 per month compared with an average of around 800 per month for the last three years. It is too early to know whether this lower rate of new arrivals was significant but it was probably due, at least in part, to an exceptionally wet and prolonged rainy season, which will have made any movement difficult. It may also have been due to the Thai government policy of not accepting any new arrivals which results in would-be refugees hiding, undeclared in the camps, or disappearing elsewhere in Thailand.

Most of the refugees arriving at the border have previously been living as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) inside Burma. In September BBC compiled a report which estimated that SPDC has relocated or destroyed over 2,500 border villages since 1996, affecting around one million people. Many of these have fled to Thailand as refugees or deeper inside Burma, but the report estimates that there are currently around 365,000 now living in over 176 SPDC relocation sites and another 270,000 living in temporary shelters or in hiding, a total of at least 630,000 IDPs. The living conditions of these IDPs are desperate and unless their escape routes are cut-off it seems inevitable that new refugees will continue to flee to Thailand until major political changes happen in Burma.

Total BBC expenditures in 2002 were baht 581 million, 18% higher than in 2001. This was the combined result of increasing refugee numbers, rising food prices, increasing inputs because of growing refugee aid-dependency, and increased staffing to handle the growing programme and the demands of donors for more monitoring and accountability. BBC also had to deal with a natural disaster and an unanticipated camp relocation during the second half of the year. There was a serious flash flood in Mae Kong Kha Camp on 2nd September in which 27 refugees lost their lives and 484 houses were destroyed or damaged. And in July the Thai Government decided to relocate Karenni Camp 3 to Karenni Camp 2 in the middle of the rainy season. Both events were traumatic for the refugees involved and resulted in unanticipated expenditures.

The revised BBC budget for 2003 is baht 707 million, a further 22% increase over 2002. This increase is mainly due to the same factors as last year with increasing refugee numbers, food prices and staffing levels continuing to push expenditures up. The budget also includes the introduction of blended food to address nutritional deficiencies in the refugee diet as anticipated on the last report. It will now take longer to introduce this item than projected last time because of the many technical and bureaucratic steps that have now been identified.

BBC has grown dramatically in recent years with staff numbers due to double in 2003 compared to 2000. The programme has become technically complex as BBC has embraced new international standards and the latest concepts relating to food aid and humanitarian practice. This has stretched the capacity of BBC's organisational structures and there will be an important evaluation of Management and Governance Structures in February 2003. The programme however remains sound and community-based as demonstrated by the Performance Indicators presented in Appendix E. Even though the programme has become more complex, administration costs remain at little more than 6% of the overall budget. The cost of the programme has increased, but is still only USD 110 per refugee/ annum or about 30 US cents/refugee per day.

BBC will begin its 20th year of operation in March, a programme originally expected to last three months! But there is still little indication of any early end to the root causes of the refugee problem. The political dialogue between SPDC and Aung San Suu Kyi appears to have ground to a halt and the ethnic issue has yet to be seriously embraced. Yet, undoubtedly changes are taking place in Burma. Compared with a few years ago, there is much more access and international contact within the country and concerted efforts to do more. Unfortunately the border populations are still largely inaccessible from Rangoon and the border issues are hidden from the international community. The challenge for BBC and others working in the border areas will be to sustain interest as attention moves inside the country and to maintain support until such time that the situation is right for the refugees to return home in safety and dignity.

As always BBC wishes to thank its Donors most sincerely for their long term support and understanding. The 2002 Donors Meeting in Ottawa was very constructive and encouraging. Although some pledges remain unconfirmed, at this time BBC has a projected income of baht 728 million for 2003, including baht 45 million carried forward as balances or funds still to be received for 2002 expenditures. To preserve a one-month cash flow balance **BBC's revised funding target for 2003 is baht 768 million. This means that BBC is currently still seeking additional funds totaling baht 40 million or about USD 0.9 million at current exchange rates.** The beginning of the year is always very difficult in terms of cash flow and BBC would urge any Donors with funds available to please transfer them as soon as possible.

2. REFUGEE SITUATION DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 2002

A brief summary of the history of the Burmese border situation is presented in Appendix C.

The total refugee caseload of concern to BBC increased by only 1,132 persons during the second half of 2002, from 143,226 at the end of June to 144,358 at the end of the year. This was partly due to a downward revision of the Mon resettlement site population (1,337), the population of the camps in Thailand increasing by 2,469 during the period.

The average population growth in the Thailand camps (new arrivals and births, less deaths and departures) has been around 800 per month for over three years and so an increase of only 411 per month was lower than in the recent past. However, taking the year as a whole, the Thailand caseload increased from 125,118 at the end of 2001 to 133,156 in December 2002, an increase of 8,038 or 670 per month.

It is not clear yet whether the recorded slow-down in new refugee arrivals during the second half of the year was significant or not. The rains were exceptionally heavy and prolonged this year and it is likely that movement was severely curtailed during this period. It has also been Thai Government policy throughout this period to accept no new arrivals. This means that would-be refugees are disappearing elsewhere in Thailand or are not declaring their presence in the camps. The real rate of new arrivals is likely to have been higher than that recorded.

The map on the facing page shows camp population changes reported to BBC during the period. The map also shows the official registered camp populations as provided by the Ministry of Interior (MOI). The latter represents an updated record of all cases approved by the Provincial Admissions Boards, but does not include rejected cases or new asylum seekers awaiting status determination. As reported last time, the MOI informed BBC in March 2002 that the official registration figure should be used as the basis for all requests to deliver assistance.

a) Admissions to Asylum

The admissions procedures set up after UNHCR was given a role on the border in 1998 is no longer operative. From the second half of 2000 the Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs) started rejecting almost all new arrivals on the grounds that they were not 'fleeing from fighting', but during 2002 the PABs did not even meet to consider any new cases. This means that there is an ever-increasing caseload of new arrivals in the camps for which no determination has been made. According to UNHCR's statistics, 33,427 persons have now (December 31st 2002) sought admission to Thailand since the MOI/UNHCR headcount/registration was carried out in May 1999 (43 months = 777 per month). Of these, 11,731 have been accepted (35%) by the PABs, 10,408 have been rejected (31%) and 11,288 (34%) have yet to be considered. The number of repatriated refugees remains at 330.

No reports were received of new arrivals or rejected refugees being forcibly repatriated during this period, but there remains an urgent need to address the issue of a growing unregistered camp population. These people are not officially entitled to food and other relief services and their numbers continue to grow. Already some refugees suffer because they are too afraid to show themselves, many live in crowded conditions because they are not allowed to build their own houses and yet others put their lives at risk by trying to hang on in Burma because they fear a hostile reception in Thailand. Some opening up or new form of registration is urgently needed.

b) Thailand/Burma Relationships

Relationships between the Thai government and SPDC improved during the second half of 2002. The Thailand/Burma border re-opened in October after being closed by the Rangoon authorities in May in retaliation for alleged Thai support of the Shan resistance. Since then, a number of official exchanges have taken place and in February the Thai Prime Minister and other high-ranking officials will be visiting Rangoon.

In recent weeks there have been reports of Thai authorities raiding Burmese opposition offices in the border areas and arresting some dissidents. Strong warnings have been made about further crackdowns against any groups using Thailand as a base to carry out activities that might negatively affect relationships with Burma.

c) Shan Refugees

The situation of Shan refugees in Thailand did not change very much during this period. The Shan Human Rights Foundation continued to report new refugees arriving in Fang District at a rate plus or minus 1,000 each month. The total Shan refugee population arriving in Thailand since 1996 could now be 150,000 to 200,000 or more.

Population Map

The relocation of mainly Wa people from northern Shan State to the Thai border area opposite Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces is ongoing. There have been no updates to estimates presented in our last report recording 126,000 people as having been relocated so far, displacing some 48,000 Shan people.

Most of the group of over 600 refugees who arrived in Wiang Heng district of Chiang Mai Province after the fighting on May 20th last year are still there. BBC continues to supply food items to a population of around 370 refugees.

Compared with this time in each of the last two years, the border is relatively quiet and for the time being no major offensives are predicted. It is possible that this relative calm is due to increased dialogue between the SPDC and Thai Government.

d) Mon Resettlement Sites

The situation in the Mon resettlement sites across the border was very unstable for most of 2002 following the resumption of fighting by the breakaway Hongsawatoi Restoration Party (HRP) with SPDC in late 2001. However, towards the end of the year the HRP began to break up with defections back to the New Mon State Party (NMSP). It is understood that residual elements of the HRP are now moving away from the Halochanee area. This will hopefully result in more stable conditions in the Mon resettlement site areas.

Meanwhile, however last year's instability has affected the refugee population badly. A survey of the health situation has shown very high levels of malnutrition amongst the population. In response BBC has asked MOI for a temporary increase in rations to the refugees in 2003. Permission has been received to give 8, rather than 4 months rice to the Halochanee population this year. This situation will be reviewed again later in the year.

e) Tham Hin Zone 4

The residual caseload of Burmese relocated to Tham Hin after the closure of Maneeloy in December 2001 is now down to 276. These people suffered a dramatic decline in living standards and freedom after moving to Tham Hin and have been very unhappy. Most had believed that they would be resettled to third countries but, for most of 2002, this seemed unlikely as UNHCR deemed their cases no different from the rest of the Tham Hin population. However, in recent months, there has been a renewed interest in this caseload by potential Third Countries, in particular the USA, and the chances of these people being resettled in 2003 seem good.

f) Camp Relocations

As reported last time, rather unexpectedly, the Thai authorities in July announced their decision to relocate Karenni Camp 3 to Karenni Camp 2, closer to the border, citing alleged problems between the camp population and the residents of the nearby Thai village of Nai Soi. NGOs and UNHCR asked for the move to be delayed until after the rains, but the authorities insisted that the move must be completed by the end of September. A complicating factor at this point was that the Forestry Department had not agreed to any land being released for the move.

In almost comical, but tragic circumstances for the refugees, BBC tried to carry out the authorities' orders and began moving the refugees in appalling weather conditions on 13th August. A small plot of land had been identified in Camp 2 and it took 5 days to relocate 50 families (out of a total of more than 900), with refugees having to haul trucks up the hill and through the mud with ropes. The move was stopped on 17th August because the conditions were so bad and the land was now full. The authorities were requested to identify more land before the move could recommence.

Rather incredulously the Forestry Department now insisted that the land already settled by the 50 families could not be used for this purpose after all and an alternative site was identified south of Camp 2 with orders to move immediately. In shocking weather conditions again, the refugees pulled down the shelters they had already built and relocated again between 28th August and 1st September.

The new piece of land was large enough to take another 200 or so families and eventually yet another site was allocated north of Camp 2. By the end of the year the move was more or less complete with many others moving in to vacant spaces within the main camp. However, 921 refugees remained in camp 3. These included 191 Kayan refugees who live in Section 6 which is effectively a tourist village (long necks) and the remainder in Section 7 where handicapped refugees are housed and several training/projects are based. No decision has yet been made on the future of these Sections.

This move effectively reduces the number of camps in Thailand to nine. No other camp moves appear to be under consideration at the moment.

Images from Umpiem Mai Camp

g) Mae Kong Kha Flood

Following heavy rain, on 2nd September the river running through Mae Kong Kha camp rose about 3 meters in 20 minutes causing widespread damage and destruction. 26 refugees died (17 bodies recovered, 9 people missing, presumed dead), 251 houses were completely destroyed affecting 1,571 people and 233 houses were partly destroyed, affecting another 1,510 people. Two high schools, 8 primary schools, 1 nursery school, 4 camp administration offices, 5 NGO offices, 4 reception centres and 2 OPD clinics were all destroyed.

The Ministry of Interior took the emergency very seriously and the Minister himself visited the camp on 3rd September. The response was prompt and effective. The Local District office set up a coordinating centre under the Nai Amphoe and received full support from the Thai Army and other local/security authorities. They worked closely with the NGOs and UNHCR who shared assessment reports and planned to send immediate relief assistance. Initially both access roads to the camp were washed away or blocked and whilst the Forestry Department and Military Mobile Development Unit set about undertaking repairs, the Thai Army's task Force 7 flew in emergency supplies by helicopter.

As always, the refugees coped well with this emergency. Those who had lost their homes initially moved in with friends and relatives and fortunately there was adequate food in the camps due to the rainy season stockpile supplies. BBC sent household items to replace those lost in the flood, including mosquito nets, blankets, sleeping mats, cooking pots and utensils, as well as plastic sheeting for temporary roofing.

The roads were eventually cleared and opened to 4WD vehicles after a few days but access remained difficult for several weeks. Even in normal conditions these roads are not accessible by ten-wheel truck in the rainy season. It was a while therefore before bamboo and other building materials could be sent in although the refugees started rebuilding with salvaged material. It also proved problematic to procure adequate bamboo supplies because of a recent ban on cutting bamboo in Mae Hong Son Province. These problems were overcome by the end of the year however, when replacement building materials had been sent into the camp and the normal delivery of food supplies resumed.

The flooding left some areas of the camp prone to land slips and some of the population has had to be relocated. There are concerns that the camp could face more flooding or landslides in the future. The Thai authorities have long wanted to relocate this camp which lies just inside the Salween national park, but no suitable alternative site can be found.

h) Ler Ber Her

The situation of Ler Ber Her, a small camp on the Burma side of the Moei river north of Mae La camp, has been reported regularly in recent reports. The camp has been attacked several times and the population evacuated to Thailand before eventually being relocated back to the other side. The last 6 months, however, was a quiet time for these people, probably due to the heavy and prolonged wet season forcing troop movements slow down. During this time the population grew by approximately 200 people to around 850. As mentioned in the last report the growth of the camp is probably due to MOI policy of not accepting or acknowledging new arrivals in Mae La camp. There have been some reports from Mae La that the Thai authorities are considering moving any new arrivals discovered in the camp to Ler Ber Her but, so far, no concrete moves have been taken to carry this out.

i) Illegal Workers

In 2001, after a decade of *ad hoc* policies in which the Thai government arbitrarily allowed the registration of fixed quotas of migrant workers, all illegal workers in Thailand were invited to register and be entitled to stay in the country for a year. Hopes were raised that this would enable a comprehensive policy to be worked out for migrant workers based on a more complete database. Some 568,249 workers registered in October 2001, of whom 451,335 were Burmese. The registration process was considered a success although many workers were deterred from registering by the relatively high fee required and because of doubts about their security. The registration figure also did not include the families of workers who probably numbered at least 200,000. The total the illegal migrant population was informally estimated to be least 1.5 million people.

It was hoped that it would be possible to build on this success by opening up the registration again in 2002 to allow those who had not registered the first time to do so. Instead, the registered workers were required to get health check-ups and register again after six months in March 2002, and no new registrations were allowed. The total number re-registering dropped to 448,480. Again in October 2002 after the initial one year-registration period expired, only those originally registered were allowed to re-apply. This time the number registering dropped to around 300,000 (exact numbers are not yet available because the Ministry responsible, Labour and Social Welfare, was split into two at about this time and processing was interrupted).

This means that for the time being there is still no long-term policy to deal with migrant workers, Instead it is still official policy that anyone not registered must be arrested and deported. This results in constant harassment and arrests of migrant workers and deportation to the border. Currently as many as 150 per day are being “deported”. In most cases however, these workers are able to re-enter the country immediately.

Meanwhile the Thai government is trying to speed up the official repatriation programme negotiated with SPDC. This is a very time-consuming procedure in which the Thai authorities have to submit lists of potential deportees for SPDC to check before allowing them into the country. They are then sent back through a repatriation Centre established in Myawaddy, across from Mae Sot. The programme was suspended after the Rangoon government closed the border in May but up to that point only 3,000 returnees had been processed since the beginning of the year. The programme was re-opened in November and another 97 cases were repatriated.

This programme is problematic so far, not just because it is very slow and has such limited capacity but also because there have been various reports of SPDC HIV/AIDS testing and/or jailing them for leaving the country illegally etc.. This will be one topic of negotiation in the forthcoming meetings between Thai and SPDC officials but, given the huge scale of the migrant worker problem in Thailand, it is unlikely that there will be any really satisfactory migrant worker policy in the near future. There are many refugees amongst the illegal migrant population and these will remain subject to exploitation and arrest and the potential danger of being sent back to Burma.

j) Internally Displaced

Since 1996 the Burmese Army has been destroying or forcibly relocating villages throughout the border areas as it attempts to control the former territory of the ethnic armies. Most of the new refugees arriving in Thailand have been living for some time as Internally Displaced People (IDPs), either in relocation sites under the control of SPDC or in hiding or on the run from the Burmese army.

In September 2002 BBC produced a report, “Internally Displaced People and Relocation Sites in Eastern Burma” in which it documented the scale and location of this displacement. The results are summarised in the Table below. BBC estimated that over 2,500 villages have been destroyed, relocated or abandoned in the border States and Divisions of Burma with Thailand since 1996 and one million people have been displaced. (see Map on Page 8) More than 200,000 of these have fled to Thailand as refugees and others have fled deeper inside Burma. But the report estimated that there are currently around 365,000 people living in over 176 relocation sites (see Map on Page 9) and around another 270,000 who are living in Temporary Shelters or in hiding, a total of over 630,000 IDPs.

Burmese Border Displaced Populations

State	IDPs in Hiding or Temporary Settlements	Number of Relocation Sites	IDPs in Relocation Sites	Affected Villages (destroyed, abandoned, or relocated)	Total IDP Population
Tenasserim	6,598	39	58,296	139	64,894
Mon State	40,000*	0	0	0	40,000
Karen State	96,469	88	99,765	719	196,234
Karenni State	50,000*	9	6,850	200*	56,850
Shan State	75,000*	40	200,000*	1,478	275,000
Totals	268,067	176**	364,911	2,536	632,978

* Extrapolated from available data. ** Plus four Wa relocation areas.

There remains little being done to resolve the IDP problem. The SPDC denies that it exists and there is very little access to the affected areas from inside the country. The only assistance being provided is whatever the ethnic groups themselves are able to deliver. This amounts to very little compared with overall needs.

Professor Sergio Pinheiro, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights for Burma visited the country in October 2002 and challenged SPDC on allegations of systematic rape by the Burmese army in Shan State. He recommended that an investigation should be carried out into these and other human rights abuses throughout the border areas. Such an official investigation is long over-due but it will likely be very difficult to get full cooperation from SPDC to carry it out. Any such investigation should also look at evidence available from the Thai side of the border and it is hoped that such an assessment can be carried out as a matter of urgency.

Affected Villages

Relocation Sites

3. BBC PROGRAMME DURING THE SECOND HALF OF 2002

Background information on BBC, including the organisational structure, is given in Appendix A. The relief programme is described in Appendix D.

a) Staffing

During the second half of 2002, recruitment of the expanded, five staff, field office teams was completed. By the end of the year each office basically comprised a Field Coordinator with overall programme responsibility; two Field Assistants (one female, one male) whose tasks include collecting the new monitoring statistics; a Field Administrator responsible for much of the monthly accounting and paperwork with suppliers; and an Office Secretary. The Field Administrator and Office Secretary jobs in Kanchanaburi were combined for the time being.

At the end of the year it was agreed to expand the field team yet again by splitting the Mae Sariang office and establishing a permanent office in Mae Hong Son. (BBC has rented an office in Mae Hong Son for several years, which has been used by Mae Sariang staff during their visits). For some time BBC had felt that it was not able to provide adequate staff cover for the Karenni camps from the Mae Sariang office which was responsible for the Karen camps in the Province, as well as any assistance to the Shan refugees. The problematic relocation of Karenni Camp 3 and the Mae Kong Kha flood put additional pressure on the office during this period and forced the decision to split this workload. The intention is to staff both the Mae Sariang and Mae Hong Son field offices with one Field Coordinator, one Field Assistant and one Field Administrator for the time being. In the short term this will require the recruitment of just one new staff.

The results of the nutrition surveys leading to recommendations to introduce blended food and trying to improve refugee food security has also necessitated the recruitment of two more staff. A Nutrition Assistant has been recruited to assist the BBC Nutritionist in the complex task of planning and introducing blended food to the food basket. And a Food Security Coordinator has been recruited for one year to expand the intensive gardening project successfully piloted in Karenni Camp 2 to the rest of the border (CAN project, see c below). Both of these staff will start work in early 2003.

A researcher has also been recruited to start work early in 2003 to take over tasks done by BBC's consultant on internal displacement during 2002. During the last few months of 2002 BBC also hired an intern to help with mapping and data analysis. It is hoped to find a replacement for this position when the current person leaves early in 2003. Finally BBC has recruited an intern to work on a BBC photo archive for six months initially, starting in February 2003.


This will bring the total BBC staff complement, including interns to 31 (18 female/13 male: 11 expatriate/20 Thai). Figure 3.1 shows the number of BBC staff in relation to the number of camps and number of refugees since 1984. For the first 11 years staffing levels were more or less constant at around 0.6 staff per 10,000 refugees but that ratio has now almost quadrupled to about 2.1 staff per 10,000 at the beginning of 2003. This was initially because of the increase in BBC's workload after the camps were consolidated in 1995 and the refugees became much more aid-dependent, but since then the rise has been due mainly to the increasingly technical nature of the programme and donor requirements for more reporting and analysis.

During the recent expansion of staff it has been possible to significantly improve BBC's former gender imbalance, particularly in the Field. During 2003 BBC should be able to consolidate a well-balanced female-male team throughout the border.

Unfortunately, yet more staff are likely to be needed in 2003. A commitment has already been made to recruit a Gender specialist to oversee the implementation of BBC's gender policy and action plan, although realistically this is unlikely to be before the second half of the year. But more significantly BBC has hired a consultant to undertake a Governance and Management Evaluation of BBC in February 2003. One of the reasons for commissioning this evaluation is that, as BBC has expanded, its small administrative capacity has become strained. Human resource management, grant tracking and reporting, technical supervision of the programme are all areas where staff strengthening is required.

Without a Human Resource office it has so far been impossible for BBC to plan systematic training for its staff although it has always been policy to encourage staff to find appropriate opportunities themselves. However, BCC has increasingly organised workshops and trainings and sent staff on courses organised by others. Staff training to date is listed in aa) Appendix D.

Figure 3.1: BBC Staff Numbers, Refugee Caseload, and Number of Camps 1984-2002



b) Rations/Nutrition

BBC carried out detailed food consumption/nutrition status surveys in Mae La camp in February 2001 and in Karenni Camp 2 in November, followed by rapid nutrition surveys in Umpiem Mai, Tham Hin and Ban Don Yang during May 2002. Some of the results of these surveys have been summarised in recent 6-month reports and comprehensive reports are available from BBC. The general results showed that the refugees are more aid-dependent than previously thought and can be summarised as follows.

- BBC provides an adequate amount of ration foods to the refugees
- Families use BBC ration foods almost exclusively for consumption within the households
- The BBC ration supplies nearly all of the nutrients in the diet
- The majority of households have very low income and purchasing power
- Chronic malnutrition is prevalent

The results showed consistently that there are significant micronutrient deficiencies in the refugee diet as well as an imbalance in the proportion of carbohydrate/protein/fat. It is also clear that whilst more can be done to encourage vegetable growing in the camps (see food security below), the scope for this is limited and the refugees themselves will not be able to adequately supplement the BBC ration themselves. Responding to the dietary deficiencies will require a number of different approaches and the cooperation of the refugee communities, other NGOs, the Thai authorities and the donors.

BBC proposed the following immediate responses to the nutrition survey results, which were discussed at the Donors meeting in Ottawa in October 2002:

- Add blended food to the ration: BBC has contacted potential suppliers of blended food in Bangkok and concluded that the necessary ingredients and expertise are available to set up a production unit with the capacity of supplying a ration of up to 1.5 kgs of blended food per person each month. A formula is currently being worked out, and a strategy to introduce the food has been developed and discussed with the field staff. A plan for monitoring and evaluation is currently being discussed with the Institute of nutrition, Mahidol University. Whilst more detailed specifications and costings are being worked out, the budget presented in Section 5 includes blended food at baht 45/kg.
- Reduce some other Food Basket Items: The provision of blended food should enable some reduction in other food basket items, particularly rice and mung beans. The budget assumes that the basic rice ration can be reduced from 16 to 15 kgs and mung beans from 1.5 kg to 1 kg. Any reduction in the rice ration will have to be introduced very carefully. The refugees have grown up using standard measuring tins both at the distribution point and in the households. Less than full measures would be considered inadequate. A key to this will be the purchase or manufacture of measuring tins and cups appropriate to the new ration rates. A reduction will

have little or no effect on the proportion of carbohydrate/protein/fat in the ration, but the addition of blended foods will increase the amount of quality protein and micronutrients in the diet.

- Continue to encourage provision of adequate and appropriate supplementary feeding foods in all camps and provide nutrition education: The types and amounts of foods provided by the Health Agencies in their supplementary feeding programmes still vary in some camps. Appropriate foods should be provided in adequate quantities targeting pregnant women to ensure optimal nutrition and weight gain and prevent stunting *in utero*. Adherence to UNHCR/WFP Guidelines for Supplementary Feeding will be encouraged. BBC staff will support nutrition education efforts in the camps providing any technical assistance requested by the medical agencies and introducing blended foods for use in weaning and other projects as deemed appropriate.
- Continue identifying and supporting food security and gardening projects: BBC has recruited a staff person to extend the Community Agriculture and Nutrition Worker's (CAN) project to all camps on the border in 2003 (see Food Security below).

BBC has presented the proposal to introduce blended food for approval to both the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and MOI. The MoPH has given the green light, and approval is pending from the MOI. It is hoped to introduce the blended food on a trial basis starting in Karenni Camp #2 in June and border-wide through January 2004.

There will be many steps involved in starting up the blended food production and distribution, and the timeline will be critically dependent on a variety of factors, most importantly gaining approval from the Thai Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The process will include developing and testing the product, gaining approval from the Thai FDA and Ministry of the Interior, and actually producing and distributing the new food. Because the approval process may be slow, the flour will be introduced without the vitamin mineral premix to pilot distribution and acceptance. Although flour is not a new food to the refugee population, a critical point in the process will be in working with the communities involved to develop easy-to-use recipes that families can use on a day to day basis, and to market the food as a benefit to health, particularly for children. A draft plan is outlined in Figure 3.2.

Figure 3.2: Plan for Introducing Blended Food Border-wide 2003/4

1. Vitamin/Mineral Premix

- 1.1 Finalise vitamin/mineral premix formula proportions
- 1.2 Develop formula
- 1.3 Develop & send premix sample (to make pilot sample)
- 1.4 Production of vit./min. premix, after order confirmation
- 1.5 Import to Thailand by airfreight, Customs clearance (deadline June 03)

2. Blended Food (Composition)

- 2.1 Develop blended food pilot sample (w/o premix)
- 2.2 Test recipe with selected camp groups
- 2.3 Recipe adjustment if necessary

3. Education and Campaign

- 3.1 Conduct meetings to introduce plan with camp committees, women's groups, health workers, teachers, etc.
- 3.2 Develop education and campaign strategy and recruit and train refugee assistants
- 3.3 Prepare materials as necessary (e.g. picture recipe cards, brochures, etc.)
- 3.4 Conduct campaigns in each camp prior to introduction of blended food

4. Packaging: Develop & Finalise

- 4.1 Individual strong laminated plastic bag of 1-3 kg, transparent w/total weight not exceeding 20 kg

5. Testing/Approval

- 5.1 Biochemistry (after receiving vit./min. premix sample)
- 5.2 Food & Drug Approval (deadline: May 03)
 - Step 1: Submit formula only (after finishing pilot sample)
 - Step 2: Submit sample if required (after receiving vit./min premix sample)

6. Cost Quotation: to be finalised after finishing pilot sample (end of February)

7. Cost Structure: Estimated/kg. raw materials +, vit/min premix + operation/production + pack

8. Finalise Order & Award Contract

9. Production Lead-time: 2 weeks

10. Delivery Lead-time: 2 weeks from CP to towns + another 2 weeks to Camps

Consumption Months:

- June Consumption: Camp 2 (w/o premix)
- July Consumption: Camp 2 (w/o premix)
- Aug: Camp 2, Mae La (w/premix)
- Sept: Camp 2, Mae La, Umpiem (w/premix)
- Oct: Camp 2, Mae La, Umpiem, Tham Hin (w/premix)
- Nov: Camp 2, Mae La, Umpiem, Tham Hin, MKK

- Dec: Camp 2, Mae La, Umpiem, Tham Hin, MKK, Don Yang
- Jan/Feb 04: Camp 2, Mae La, Umpiem, Tham Hin, MKK, Don Yang, MRML, Camp #5, Nu Po

c) Food Security

At the beginning of 2000, MOI introduced a new policy to encourage NGOs to support projects enabling refugees to grow vegetables and livestock for their own consumption. Prior to this, seeds had been distributed as requested and some small agricultural initiatives had been undertaken in some camps, but this new policy enabled a more comprehensive approach. In response, a number of NGOs set up training courses and small agriculture support projects in some of the camps.

With increased focus on the nutritional status of the refugees and results from the food consumption/nutrition surveys in hand, BBC has actively supported food security projects as a way of supplementing BBC rations and targeting micronutrient deficiencies. In particular, BBC has provided start-up materials, such as seeds and tools, and nutrition training to the Community Agriculture and Nutrition Worker's (CAN) project.

This innovative project, initiated by a refugee in Karenni Camp 3, trains camp residents in organic gardening techniques using limited space and focuses on growing food that target specific nutrient deficiencies, particularly vitamin A and C and iron. The project has been successfully implemented in Karenni Camp 2 via a 'demonstration' site and short, 5-day trainings for camp residents. Gardens include a variety of produce, such as roselle, pumpkin, amaranth, drumstick trees, etc. The Table below indicates the total number of people (households) trained as of December 2002. This represents about 30% of the population and, although figures are not available, additional households have adopted some of the technology from their neighbours and friends who have started gardens.

Figure 3.3: Households Trained in Intensive Organic Gardening

Karenni Camp	Total Households Trained	% Trained- Women	% Trained -Low Literacy
#2	533	56	53
#3	180	53	46
#5	422	64	68

Note: training in camp #3 was interrupted when the camp was moved during the last half of 2002.

BBC has hired a Food Security Coordinator to work with the Karen Refugee Committee to transfer this technology to other camps on the border during 2003. The Food Security Project Coordinator will begin in March to assist in producing a training manual, and will initiate 2 trainings, in April and July, for selected participants from each camp. Intensive follow-up in the camps will continue throughout the year. BBC will also continue to support other requests for seeds and saplings, and will continue to analyse this situation to provide support/coordination where appropriate.

d) BBC Logframe

The initial BBC Logframe, drafted in 2001 and presented in recent reports, prioritised the setting up of objectives for food distribution and identification of appropriate Performance Indicators. These were established by the end of 2002 and BBC presented a more comprehensive Logframe to the Ottawa Donors Meeting in October including objectives for shelter and relief items, coordination of services, assistance to Thai communities, gender and refugee participation. The revised Logframe is presented in Figure 3.4.

e) Monitoring/Performance Indicators

Data collection procedures for all of BBC's priority Performance Indicators relating to food distribution were established during 2002. During the second half of the year the new field assistants were familiarised with the new distribution, ration book and household control checks, and the standardised stock and distribution records introduced earlier in the year. These are quite complicated and sensitive and small sample rates were maintained to give adequate time for staff to learn these tasks. A workshop was held at the end of the year to share progress and discuss problems. Problems of interpretation of results and difficulties in getting accurate answers to some questions were identified and it was agreed to focus on improving the consistency of the checks for the first half of 2003 before expanding to more optimum sample rates later in the year.

The Performance Indicators for the second half of 2002 are set out in Appendix E. These include the food distribution Indicators set out in the original Logframe but also includes some of the new Indicators mentioned in e) above. Some of the new Indicators remain unspecified, in particular those for gender where input will be sought from the proposed new gender specialist. It is planned to establish data collection and recording for all the new indicators during 2003.

f) Gender

BBC recruited a gender consultant for 6 months in 2002 and a draft Gender Policy and Action Plan was presented to the BBC Donors Meeting in October. The process of developing the policy and plan revealed a wide range of understanding of gender issues amongst the staff and highlighted many challenges for BBC to address in its future plans. It became clear that the provision of equal opportunity does not necessarily lead to equal participation without pro-active work to achieve positive change. Staff realise that the process of transformation is inevitably slow, and will require long term commitment and enthusiasm on the part of many rather than just a few individuals, especially in a culturally diverse population.

BBC acknowledges that defining and implementing a gender policy will be an ongoing process. It's initial goal, and objectives are considered as realistic in the context of current gender awareness in BBC. BBC recognises that men and women are at different stages of gender awareness and as a result, different activities will be targeted for men and women within the refugee communities.

The Gender policy is presented in u) Appendix D and provides a framework for practical steps to be taken for implementation both in the field and within the organisation. BBC has established an internal Gender Working Group to ensure that gender awareness remains clearly in focus and the policy becomes a working document. The Group will meet three or four times a year to monitor progress and update the action plan.

Over the next year emphasis will be on training and staff development in order to incorporate a gender perspective in specific aspects of the programme. Activities will include trainings with staff, research on how and where the refugee women are involved in the delivery of the programme, disaggregating figures by sex in all reporting, and establishment of consumer advisory groups (CAG) in all camps to provide a representative platform for discussion within the camp communities. A Community Development Coordinator will be recruited with an emphasis on equitable access of services for all, but specifically in relation to gender, ethnicity and religion.

As mentioned under item a) Staffing, the rapid expansion of the BBC team has enabled the recruitment of more women resulting in a much more gender balanced staff, especially in the field where this was the greatest concern. Work is underway to review BBC staff policies with a gender perspective.

g) Protection

BBC participated fully in the CCSDPT/UNHCR protection working group set up following the workshop "Protection is a shared responsibility" jointly organised by CCSDPT and UNHCR in 2000. During 2001/2 this working group organised 5 specific protection workshops on 'Education', 'Food, Shelter, Water and Sanitation' and 'Health', 'Sexual and Gender Based Violence' (SGBV) and 'Assistance to Communities outside Camps'.

In response to these workshops BBC is committed to reducing the need for refugees to leave camps where they are subject to arrest and other physical abuse by Thai authorities and local communities. BBC will try to provide sufficient building materials and greater support for initiatives to improve agriculture and vegetable gardens in the camps to supplement the basic food basket.

Protection Working groups have now been established at the field level and a second Director level UNHCR/NGO protection workshop was held in September 2002 to review progress and make ongoing plans. Issues of concern for BBC are:

- Standard Incident Report Form. This is a tool to generate appropriate action when a protection incident occurs. A form has been introduced and will be piloted by the NGOs in the field over the next 6 months.
- Code of Conduct on Sexual Exploitation to be developed by all NGOs. BBC has had discussions regarding a Code of Conduct and will draw up a policy in the next 6 months.
- Increasing numbers of unregistered arrivals in the camps.
- Ongoing Training on Protection for all NGO staff. This will be incorporated into CCSDPT strategic planning.

h) Environment

As described in f) and h) Appendix D, BBC began supplying cooking fuel and building materials in 1995 when the camps started to become larger under the consolidation programme. BBC has also supported the production of cooking stoves and promoted their use over the traditional three stones method. The cooking fuel and building material supplies were introduced incrementally but now all camps receive "full" rations of these items accounting for about 22% of total budgeted BBC expenditures for 2003.

Cooking Fuel

BBC has now implemented most of the recommendations from the UNHCR consultant's review of BBC's cooking fuel supplies undertaken in May 2000. Outstanding projects are the extension of improved cooking stoves to Tak, Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi provinces and teaching improving cooking methods. BBC has not had available staff to undertake these tasks, but the new Food Security Coordinator will appraise this during 2003.

Previous reports have detailed the "success" of an experiment introducing firewood to cover part of the cooking fuel needs of Tham Hin camp. 50% of the camp cooking fuel energy needs were supplied as firewood, which proved acceptable to the local Thai authorities, the refugee committees and the camp population and saved BBC 34% on costs as compared with supplying 100% charcoal. Last year MOI approved an extension of the experiment to Karenni Camp 3 and Umpiem Mai at the same proportion and asked that the proportion of firewood in Tham Hin be increased to 70%.

Unfortunately this second phase of the experiment has been less successful. The experiment in Karenni Camp 3 had to be abandoned when the camp was relocated to Camp 2, where access is possible only by 4WD vehicles. The residents of Umpiem Mai remain concerned about fire risk due to high winds in the camp and BBC has been supplying windbreakers to try to solve the problem. But storage difficulties and problems in securing quality supplies is making the experiment unpopular in this camp.

Meanwhile there are many problems with firewood distribution in Tham Hin. The distribution process using measuring frames is cumbersome enough, but varying pole sizes and inconsistent mixtures of dry, wet and green wood sent in by the suppliers, make equitable distribution extremely difficult and time-consuming. Distribution takes at least four times as long as for the equivalent amount of charcoal. Quality control is very difficult. There are problems in providing adequate storage for such bulky supplies and then the residents complain of smoke and fumes given off by the wood in overcrowded housing conditions. Although firewood offers potential large savings in fuel costs it seems unlikely that it will be possible to extend the experiments much further. Indeed it may be more realistic to abandon these experiments altogether.

The 2000 Fuel Survey concluded that fuel supplies were up to 50% less than real needs but recommended that some of the deficiency could be addressed by, amongst other things, introducing more efficient fuel and cooking procedures. Most of the recommendations have now been implemented and from staff monitoring, it seems clear that there is still a deficiency of at least 25%. BBC therefore plans to hire another consultant to review the new situation. New charcoal products continue to be introduced to the market all the time that might offer other savings/efficiencies, but it is difficult to assess their relative merits. It seems extremely unlikely however, that further efficiencies will be able to eliminate the deficiency and so an increase of 10% in fuel rations is planned for 2003.

Building Materials

BBC supplied building materials for house repairs to all camps for the first time in 2000 but different standards were used in different camps depending on the availability of local supplies. It proved difficult to procure adequate and consistently good quality supplies due largely to many restrictions on cutting and transporting bamboo in Thailand. Some improvements were achieved in 2002 but there were still significant differences in supplies given to different camps. One solution has been to use eucalyptus rather than bamboo poles. Eucalyptus is more readily available and has a longer life, but is expensive.

Refugees going out of the camps to cut materials is now considered a serious protection issue, aggravating relationships with the Thai authorities and exposing the refugees to arrest and, sometimes, physical abuse. BBC has established standards to ensure that refugees will receive sufficient materials for building and repairs, which it hopes can be applied to all camps for 2003 as set out in f) Appendix D.

i) Supply Purchasing/Tendering

BBC now carries out competitive tendering border-wide for rice, mung beans, cooking oil, cooking fuel, bednets, blankets and sleeping mats, representing over 80% of all BBC commodity purchases. The whole procurement process, including the advertising of tenders, bidding process, opening of bids, awarding of contracts and invoice/payment procedures, has been upgraded and standardised since 2000 to meet major donor requirements.

The introduction of competitive tendering has undoubtedly been successful in ensuring that the suppliers offer the best possible prices, but it has also created many problems as documented in previous reports, particularly in balancing prices paid with the quality of service provided. It has also created a huge administrative workload. An evaluation of these procedures is planned for the first half of 2003 under BBC's contract with IRC. It is hoped that this might help identify ways of streamlining these procedures.

j) Quality Control

BBC contracted a professional quality control company for the first time in 2001 and carried out independent quality control inspections of all ECHO contracts. Sample checks were made on weight, packaging and quality for every truck of rice, mung beans, cooking oil and cooking fuel delivered to Umpiem Mai and Mae La camps. The refugee committees continued to carry out a second check at the time of delivery/distribution.

All of the supplies passed the checks in 2001, but BBC considered them to be a useful safeguard, particularly when introducing new suppliers and for the stockpile period when the refugee committees only check quality at the time of distribution, well after the date of delivery. It was concluded that the combination of independent inspections at the loading point, refugee committee checks in camp plus BBC staff monitoring, makes for very effective quality control.

Given the zero rejection rate however, checking every truck seemed rather excessive and for ECHO contracts in 2002, inspections were carried out only on 50% rather than 100% of deliveries. Sample checks were also initiated on all contracts for rice, beans, oil and charcoal for all other camps as well, with at least one professional inspection carried out per contract (usually six months). Results of the Quality Control checks during the second half of 2002 are set out in Appendix E.

Single checks per contract proved inadequate in some areas, particularly for the stockpile contracts and so for 2003 the independent inspectors will check rice and cooking fuel (the most problematic items regarding quality) at least every two months for each supplier and more frequently during the stockpiling period. Mung beans and cooking oil (no problems found yet with quality or quantity for these two items) will continue to be inspected at least once per contract.

k) IDPs

A database on displacement was begun in 2001 and the ethnic groups continued to expand this during the year. The aim was to standardise information collected by the different ethnic groups, in order to be able to analyse and present the situation in the border areas backed up by ongoing statistics. To complement this, the corresponding information was also being mapped at the same time to build up a clearer picture. However the process has proven to be complex and much of the data has yet to be 'cleaned' (screened for errors). The ethnic groups have therefore also been manually collating all known information on IDP relocation and hiding sites and preparing maps and population estimates. BBC published the results of this exercise in September 2002 in the report "Internally Displaced People and Relocation Sites in Eastern Burma" referred to in Section 2.

The situation in the border areas continues to deteriorate and this report will be updated further. BBC recruited a consultant to oversee this work in 2002 and this research position will now be continued as a full time staff member for 2003.

l) Assistance to Thai Villages

As described in l) Appendix D, the BBC continues to support requests for assistance to Thai communities. Much of the support goes to Thai authority personnel involved in camp security, but BBC also supports emergency and development requests.

During this period, BBC supported 7 requests for emergency assistance, the largest being rice for flood affected areas in Suan Pung and Sangkhlaburi Districts and support to the District Office in Wieng Heng dealing with the Shan emergency in May. BBC supported 14 requests for Thai development programmes, the largest being rice support for school lunch programmes in Umphang and Mae Sot Districts.

IDPs

BBC continues to purchase vegetables from the local population for supply in Tham Hin camp, a programme set up in 2001 to improve relationships between the local residents and camp population. It is difficult to maintain quality, quantity and consistent prices but these distributions are popular with the refugees and serves the purpose of improving public relations. BBC currently supplies 4,000 kgs of vegetables per month.

As described under p) Clothing, below, BBC also donated 29,300 pieces of warm clothing and 9,800 quilts to Thai villagers from shipments of used clothing received from USA and Japan.

m) Safe House

The original concept of the Safe House back in 1993 was to allow sick migrant workers, arrested and deported by the Thai authorities, to recuperate at the house before continuing their journey. Over the years however, the deportees suffering from chronic illnesses, particularly mental illness, have remained at the facility, and have gradually altered the focus of the care required for their well-being. These days over half of the patients at any one time are chronically ill long-stayers.

In 1999, a psychiatric consultant made a number of recommendations to improve the facilities and care of the chronically ill, and these recommendations have been gradually implemented since that time. The House Mother, who initially was covering all of the work alone, now has a total of six assistants who are responsible for bedside care when patients are admitted to hospital, day to day care at the Safe House, and the maintenance and upkeep of the facility. Segregated accommodation for males and females has now been completed and the patients are receiving appropriate medicines that enable them to participate more actively in community life.

The Safe House now provides an active and industrious environment where the patients share in support activities. Vegetable gardens, fishponds, pig and chicken raising, weaving and sewing skills, are all carried out by the patients. Trainers from the Thai community have also visited the Safe House to teach natural dyeing and sewing/weaving skills, and products are sold locally to generate some small income for the residents.

This is a small programme in the overall BBC budget, but the benefits to the residents and surrounding community are large and continue to grow. The house mother has been untiring in her dedication and care over the last nine years, but even she has been amazed at what the residents have been able to achieve.

n) Visibility

BBC's 'visibility' policy is set out in z) Appendix D. This is in effect an 'invisibility' policy reaffirming BBC's long-standing policy of maintaining a low key profile on the border.

The European Commission, however, currently BBC's largest Donor, legally requires visibility for ECHO and the EC Uprooted People's Fund contributions to the programme. In the spirit of the BBC policy both agreed in 2002 to use 'visibility' projects to benefit the refugees as much as possible rather than just printing logos on sacks and containers as required the previous year. This project includes the installation of notice boards at each godown, which will include information about EC/ECHO (and other Donors), health and nutrition information and other camp information. All camp committee members and godown workers have received T-shirts/jackets/baseball caps, with ECHO/EC logos on those used in camps where ECHO/EC funds are used. Prizes and trophies have also been given for sports events in each camp.

o) Camp Administration Support

As described in r) Appendix D, in 2002 BBC established a standard rate of baht 1.8/refugee/per month for the refugee committees to carry out their administrative duties in the camps, replacing the old system whereby they retained a proportion of proceeds from the sale of rice sacks. This now appears as a budget line item. These funds are being used for many types of expenditure such as the purchase of office supplies, torch batteries for night patrols, funerals, festivals, travel costs, entertaining visitors, social welfare and stipends for volunteers. The committees are now presenting six-monthly accounts, the first of which are summarised in Appendix D, and the rate will be adjusted as required.

BBC Supplies

p) Clothing

As described in g) Appendix D, BBC has been organising distributions of used clothing from overseas for several years. However, delays within the Thai bureaucracy have invariably meant that these supplies have been distributed later than intended, sometimes after the cool season. In 2002, however, after much hard work by BBC staff and Thai government officials, large shipments of clothing and quilts were received from Lutheran World Relief and the Shanti Volunteer Association in time for the cold weather.

During October and November BBC distributed over 250,000 quilts and pieces of used clothing from the USA donated by Lutheran World Relief, including over 7,800 new quilts for Thai villagers and 2,000 new quilts for distribution by the Thai Red Cross in Mahasarakam province.

During December BBC distributed over 170,000 used jackets and sweaters from Japan donated by the Shanti Volunteer Association, including over 27,000 pieces for Thai villagers and 2,300 pieces for distribution by the Thai Red Cross to Thai villagers.

Each refugee was therefore able to receive at least 2 pieces of warm clothing, the most systematic distribution of clothing undertaken so far.

In 2002 BBC has also supported a longyi-weaving project organised by the Karen and Karenni Women's Organisations. A longyi is a Burmese style wrap-around 'skirt' worn by both men and women. Refugee women traditionally wear longyis whereas the used clothing often includes inappropriate dresses. The aim is for all the camps to produce one longyi for men and women in alternate years starting with women's longyis in 2002.

For the Karen Camps, the Karen Women's Organisation (KWO) in Mae La was chosen to start the project as they had the experience and capacity in producing good quality longyis in the sufficient quantities. Thread was bought locally in Mae Sod and KWO was initially paid 22 Baht per longyi. However this proved to be insufficient to provide for the maintenance of looms and the payment was increased to 25 baht, which allows for a small profit. The KWO on Umpiem Mai also had two looms and were able to produce enough longyis for their own needs as well as supplying a small quantity for a further four camps along the border.

Although Mae La has the capacity to produce sarongs for all the camps along the border, the plan is that in 2003 each camp, except possibly Tham Hin, should be able to provide for their own needs. Further training has been initiated in several camps and additional looms are being supplied to increase production capacity.

Longyis are produced in both Karenni Camps 2 and 5 and two more looms will be supplied to Camp 2.

For year 2003 sarongs will be produced for men, which traditionally are of a noticeably different design to the women's. The project began as a response to a need to provide appropriate clothing to refugee women but has now grown to be a regular production for all adults in the camps. The program increases the Women's Organisations inputs to camp, provides training in small business administration and is a much-needed source of skills training. The total cost per sarong is just over 85 baht each, which includes training and the provision of new looms and facilities.

q) BBC Work Plan

At the end of 2002 BBC developed a detailed 2003 Work Plan with input from all staff. This was a successful exercise in making all aware of priority tasks but also served to highlight the pressure BBC is under to introduce more and more programme initiatives. The Plan as drafted is probably unrealistic in terms of expected achievements in the first half of the year, but it will be monitored and developed as an ongoing management tool.

4. 2002 EXPENDITURES COMPARED WITH BUDGET

Actual programme expenditures for 2002 compared with projected expenditures for the year presented in the last (August 2002) six-monthly report are set out below. This projection assumed an end of year refugee population in the camps in Thailand of around 136,000 and then-current food prices with rice at baht 775 per 100kg.

Item	Revised (Aug) 2002 Projection (baht)	Quantity	Actual 12 month Expenditure (baht)	Quantity
1. RICE	243,323,000		241,928,636	
Rice (100 kg sacks)	195,323,000	252,000	199,256,540	258,247
Emergency	48,000,000	60,000	42,672,096	54,402
2. OTHER FOOD	125,377,000		127,708,152	
Fish/Prawn Paste (kgs)	15,161,000	1,274,000	15,469,460	1,288,370
Salt (kgs)	3,347,000	592,000	3,563,097	624,914
Mung Beans (kgs)	45,757,000	1,660,000	47,521,430	1,750,516
Cooking oil (lts)	37,376,000	1,453,000	37,713,898	1,447,208
Chillies (kgs)	9,755,000	161,000	9,343,815	152,641
Sardines (kgs)	4,481,000	94,000	4,481,472	94,425
Supplementary Feeding	9,500,000		9,614,980	
3. RELIEF SUPPLIES	102,361,000		108,347,064	
Charcoal	85,497,000	10,558,000	88,944,975	10,990,981
Firewood	1,348,000	2,900	1,717,727	3,776
Bednets	4,323,000	49,700	5,414,951	63,822
Blankets	6,468,000	75,200	6,648,932	76,879
Mats	125,000	900	1,136,100	12,300
Clothing	4,600,000		4,484,379	
4. MEDICAL	6,500,000		6,184,706	
Medical	6,500,000		6,184,706	
5. OTHER ASSISTANCE	44,000,000		52,933,854	
Misc./Emergency	11,000,000		14,453,211	
Building Supplies	27,000,000		30,864,256	
School Support	2,000,000		2,100,000	
Thai Support	4,000,000		5,516,387	
6. PROGRAMME SUPPORT	8,650,000*		11,591,948	
Relief Transport	1,000,000		1,477,637	
Quality Control	1,600,000		1,910,569	
Camp Administration	2,800,000		2,765,552	
Consultants, Studies, Misc	2,750,000		4,876,243	
Donors Meeting	500,000		561,947	
7. ADMINISTRATION	31,800,000		32,343,606	
Salaries/Benefits	18,700,000	Up to 25 staff	18,333,805	Up to 26 staff
Vehicle	4,600,000	Up to 11	5,863,507	Up to 13
Office and Administration	8,500,000		8,146,294	
Total:	562,011,000*		581,037,966	

* There was a sub-total error of baht 800,000 on page 27 of the August 2002 6-month report

The total cost of the programme in 2002 was baht 581,037,966 (103%) compared with baht 562,011,000 projected in August 2002. Food expenditures were close to budget since refugee numbers and food prices were close to projections. Charcoal expenditures were higher than budgeted because the problematic firewood experiment did not allow rations to be cut as planned. Bednet and sleeping mat purchases appear high but the new procurement procedures required 20 % deposit on 2003 supplies. Building supplies were high because at the time of the estimate it was understood that all of the dry season supplies had been paid for whereas bills were outstanding for payment in July. The Misc./Emergency budget was overspent because of the Mae Kong Kha Flood coinciding with the relocation of Karenni Camp 2. Quality control checks were increased after some problems arose with some contracts. The Consultancy, Studies, Misc. Support line was under-budgeted and includes visibility, admin support for ERA offices, the ERA and data mapping consultants. One new vehicle was purchased ahead of schedule.

5. REVISED 2003 BUDGET COMPARED WITH ACTUAL 2002 EXPENDITURES

Revised budgeted expenditures for 2003 compared with actual expenditures in 2002 are as follows:

Item	Actual 2002 Expenditures (baht)	Quantity	Budget 2003 Expenditures (baht)	Quantity
1. RICE	241,928,636		267,132,000	
Rice (100kgs)	199,256,540	258,247	225,132,000	263,000
Emergency	42,672,096	54,402	42,000,000	49,000
2. OTHER FOOD	127,708,152		184,015,000	
Fish Paste (kgs)	15,469,460	1,288,370	16,893,000	1,421,000
Salt (kgs)	3,563,097	624,914	3,322,000	592,000
Beans (kgs)	47,521,430	1,750,516	43,463,000	1,708,000
Blended Food (kgs)			30,718,000	683,000
Cooking Oil (ltrs)	37,713,898	1,447,208	59,913,000	1,560,000
Chillies (kgs)	9,343,815	152,641	12,873,000	219,000
Sardines (kgs)	4,481,472	94,425	4,833,000	93,000
Supplementary Feeding	9,614,980		12,000,000	
3. RELIEF SUPPLIES	108,347,064		124,027,000	
Charcoal (kgs)	88,944,975	10,990,981	104,163,000	12,682,000
Firewood (cm)	1,717,727	3,776	1,273,000	3,000
Bednets	5,414,951	63,822	4,080,000	52,000
Blankets	6,648,932	76,879	6,631,000	81,000
Mats	1,136,100	12,300	3,880,000	6,000
Clothing	4,484,379		4,000,000	
4. MEDICAL	6,184,706		6,500,000	
Medical	6,184,706		6,500,000	
5. OTHER ASSISTANCE	52,933,854		72,000,000	
Misc./Emergency	14,453,211		12,000,000	
Building supplies	30,864,256		52,000,000	
School Support	2,100,000		2,000,000	
Thai Support	5,516,387		6,000,000	
6. PROGRAMME SUPPORT	11,591,948		10,480,000	
Relief Transport	1,477,637		2,500,000	
Quality Control	1,910,569		2,500,000	
Consultants, Studies, Misc.	4,876,243		2,000,000	
Camp Administration	2,765,552		2,980,000	
Donors Meeting	561,947		500,000	
7. ADMINISTRATION	32,343,606		43,177,000	
Salaries/Benefits	18,333,805	Up to 26 staff	26,097,000	Up to 37 staff
Vehicle	5,863,507	Up to 13	6,932,000	Up to 19
Office & Administration	8,146,294		10,148,000	
TOTAL:	581,037,966		707,330,000	

The revised expenditure projection for 2003 is baht 707,330,000 (97%) compared with the preliminary estimate of baht 727,080,000 million presented in the last report. Although the revised budget is just 3% lower than the preliminary budget presented in August, it incorporates a number of significant changes.

Revised Assumptions for 2003

1) Refugee Numbers: As described in Section 2, the number of new refugees entering the refugee camps in Thailand has been steady for the last three years, averaging around 800 per month. But, as always, the number of new refugees arriving during 2003 will depend on whether the situation changes in Burma and whether Thailand continues to grant them asylum. Although Aung San Suu Kyi was released in May and this was supposed to open the way to genuine political dialogue, the reality is that as the year progressed this became less and less likely. By the end of the year the political process appeared to have reached stalemate. The ethnic issue, the most sensitive problem of all, had yet to be addressed seriously at all. The chances of any real political change during 2003 therefore still look remote and prospects for the border areas look bleak. SPDC seems determined to complete its campaign to take total control of the border areas by destroying or relocating the entire rural population. Hundreds of thousands of Internally Displaced Persons documented in Section 2 remain potential refugees.

The current Thai policy however is not to allow any new refugee arrivals and during the early weeks of 2003 the authorities began to clamp down on anti-Rangoon exiles. Thai policy to improve relationships with her neighbouring country implies further restrictions and control of the border areas, which may make it increasingly difficult for new refugees to enter the country. However, the border is long and still remains porous in some areas. The situation across the border is so desperate that new refugees are likely to continue to arrive at a similar rate to that experienced during the last three years.

Purely for the purpose of budgeting, therefore, BBC is assuming a continuing rate of 800 new arrivals per month throughout the period. This would give an average caseload (mid-year 2003) of about 138,000 in the camps in Thailand. To these can be added at least 11,000 Mon refugees in resettlement camps across the border who will still need partial assistance. The total mid-2003 caseload is therefore assumed to be around 149,000. This is slightly more conservative estimate than that made in the preliminary budget, but this increase in refugees alone would add about baht 23 million to the cost of supplies in the BBC programme.

b) BBC Staff and Vehicles: As mentioned in Section 2, the BBC will carry out an evaluation of its Management and Structure in February 2003. This follows rapid expansion of BBC during the last 3 years during which staff levels have more than doubled. It is clear that several new positions will have to be created to deal with the increasing administrative and technical workload and, pending the results of the evaluation, for budgeting purposes six new jobs are assumed for 2003

1. A senior management position responsible for administration/human resources
2. A middle management person responsible for administration/human resources
3. A middle management position to oversee implementation of BBC's gender policy
4. A middle management level position to oversee monitoring/evaluation/quality aspects of the programme.
5. A Field Assistant for the new Mae Hong Son Province office
6. A clerk to support procurement and quality control.

Six new positions were also projected in the preliminary budget but two have already been filled (Displacement Research Coordinator and Nutrition Assistant). Positions 5 and 6 represent yet two more staff required due to the opening of the Mae Hong Son Office and the spiralling demands of the procurement and quality control procedures.

Four new vehicles were included in the preliminary budget for 2003 as well as the replacement of the three oldest vehicles in the fleet, and remain in the revised budget.

Total administration costs will increase by about baht 9 million (+30%) in 2003. With recruitment planned later in 2003, BBC staff will be 10 more than in 2002, an effective increase of around one third

c) Commodity Prices: BBC enjoyed unusually low commodity prices during the last four years but prices are now rising. The average rice price in 2002 was baht 772 per 100kgs, but the average contract price agreed for 2003 so far is baht 856 (+10%). A recent government decision to enforce truck loading weights has also had to be factored into all supply costs, but most items are relatively stable in price except for cooking oil. The average contract price for cooking oil in 2003 is baht 38.4 per litre compared with baht 26 in 2002 (+48%). Altogether commodity price rises add about baht 46 million to 2003 expenditures compared with 2002.

d) Nutrition Response: The preliminary budget for 2003 assumed that BBC would introduce blended food to the food basket at a rate of 1.5 kgs/adult/month. The rice ration was planned to be reduced from 16 to 15 kgs/adult/month and cooking oil from one litre to 0.7 litres/person/month. It was assumed that blended food would be tested first in two camps in February and March for border-wide distribution from April. The implementation schedule has proven to be over-optimistic because of the time required setting up production and getting the necessary Thai Government approvals. A more realistic schedule is assumed for the revised budget with the first tests in June and then incremental introduction to other camps through January 2004 (see Section 3 b). It has also been decided to cut the mung bean ration from 1.5kg to 1kg/adult/month, rather than reducing cooking oil since it will be an important ingredient for cooking some blended food recipes.

Although final costings still cannot be made it is thought that it will be possible to produce blended food within baht 45/kg. The net cost to the programme (allowing for compensating reductions in rice and beans) will be around baht 25 million for this slower implementation programme. The full cost of introducing blended food will not be felt until 2004.

e) Building Supplies/Cooking Fuel: As described in Section 2 and Appendix D, for 2003 BBC will attempt to standardise building material supplies for all camps. This will add baht 21 million to 2002 building supply costs, slightly higher than in the preliminary budget due to the use of more eucalyptus and higher transport costs. As mentioned in Section 2 Cooking Fuel rations have been budgeted to increase by 10 % in 2003.

6. BBC FUNDING SITUATION

The first BBC Donors Meeting was convened in Amsterdam in 1996 and these have since been held annually in Stockholm (1997), London (1998), New York (1999), Oslo (2000), Chiang Mai (2001) and Ottawa (2002). The 8th meeting is scheduled for Brussels in October 2003.

One of the main objectives of the Donors Meetings is to raise the necessary funds for the following year based on BBC's preliminary budget, and to ensure that funds are scheduled for transfer throughout the year to avoid cash-flow difficulties. Generally speaking, the Donors Meetings on the day have not raised all the funding required, nor, indeed, solved the cash-flow problems, but they have established the necessary parameters for BBC to follow up with the Donors afterwards.

a) 2002 Funding

Table 6.1 summarises the funding situation for 2002. Total expenditures were baht 581,037,966 million, and baht 553,936,738 million was received as income, i.e., BBC incurred a deficit of baht 27,101,227 million for 2002. A reserve of baht 45,874,798 million was carried forward from 2001, which was reduced to baht 18,773,571 million for 2003. However, ECHO approved two grants late in the year, effectively for 2002 expenditures. These will be received in 2003 totalling around baht 27 million. This means that the effective balance carried forward from 2002 was about baht 45.8 million, the same as carried forward from 2001, a breakeven situation.

b) 2003 Funding Needs

The revised budget for 2003 is set out on in Section 5, totalling baht 707 million (or USD 16.6 million at the current exchange rate of 1 USD = 42.5 baht), representing an increase of 22% over projected 2002 expenditures. The assumptions behind this budget have been explained and the main reasons for the increase set down. In summary, the increase over 2002 is made up as follows:

Item/Factor	Increase (baht million) over 2002 budget	Contribution to increase over 2002
Refugee numbers	23	4
Commodity prices	46	8
Nutrition response	25	4
Administration	9	2
Charcoal/Building supplies	32	4
Reduced budgets *	(9)	
Total:	126	22%

*This table is illustrative. It is not possible to separate all items and there are some balancing reductions in some budget items.

Table 6.2 shows the current expected receipts for 2003 based on pledges made at the Donors Meeting in October and some subsequent revisions. Currently projected income is baht 728 million compared with a total funding requirement of baht 768 million to maintain the budgeted one month cash flow reserve, i.e. BBC currently requires an additional baht 40 million (USD 0.9 million) for 2003.

c) Sensitivity of Assumptions

The budget presented is extremely sensitive to the main assumptions and in particular to the rice price and foreign currency exchange rate. The following Table shows how BBC costs have risen over the years but also how annual expenditures have stabilised or jumped when prices and exchange rates have stabilised or moved. It can be seen that annual increases of 50% and more have not been uncommon and in fact the average annual increase has been around 36% per annum!

The apparently stable situation during 1999 to 2001 was actually quite unusual. Growing programme expenditures were masked by falling prices. Programme costs grew only 7% whilst refugee numbers increased 16%, staffing levels increased 50% and expenditures on such items as cooking fuel and building materials doubled. 2002 expenditures increased by 18%, more accurately reflecting increasing programme inputs.

The 22 % increase in budget for 2003 is the result of a combination of factors as outlined above but could be even higher if prices and exchange rates continue to go the 'wrong' way. During the last six months the Thai baht has been extremely volatile swinging from near 45 to the US dollar down almost to 40, and rice prices have started to rise. The Table shows how 2003 budget needs would change if the exchange rate and prices shifted to the levels experienced in 1998/9. A combination of rice prices rising to 1998 levels and the baht strengthening to 1999 levels, would increase BBC funding needs from the projected USD 16.6 million to USD 20.1 million.

Table 6.1

Table 6.2

Cost of BBC Programme in Thai baht and US Dollars: 1984 to 2003

Year	BBC Expenditures (baht m)	% increase on previous year	Average Exchange rate (baht/USD)	BBC Expenditures (USD m)	Average Rice Price (baht)	Average population	Cost/refugee/annum (baht)	Cost/refugee/annum (USD)
1984	3		25	0.1		9,500	350	14
1985	4	33	25	0.2	390	12,800	330	13
1986	7	75	25	0.3	281	17,300	400	16
1987	13	86	25	0.5	372	19,100	690	28
1988	19	46	25	0.7	555	19,700	960	38
1989	22	16	25	0.9	595	21,200	1,050	42
1990	34	55	25	1.3	527	33,100	1,020	41
1991	62	82	25	2.5	556	49,600	1,250	50
1992	75	21	25	3.0	551	60,800	1,240	50
1993	86	15	25	3.4	496	69,300	1,240	50
1994	98	14	25	3.9	518	74,700	1,320	53
1995	181	85	25	7.3	700	84,800	2,140	86
1996	212	18	25	8.5	750	98,000	2,170	87
1997	292	38	40	7.3	798	115,000	2,530	63
1998	461	58	40	11.5	1,065	114,000	4,040	101
1999	481	4	38	12.7	920	114,000	4,220	111
2000	457	(10)	40	11.4	775	123,000	3,710	93
2001	494	8	44	11.2	730	133,000	3,715	84
2002	581	18	43	13.5	772	141,000	4,121	96

2003 Budget

2003(a)	707	22	42	16.6	857	149,000	4,745	111
2003(b)	707	22	38	18.6	857	149,000	4,745	125
2003(c)	762	31	42	17.9	1,065	149,000	5,114	120
2003(d)	762	31	38	20.1	1,065	149,000	5,114	135

(a) Exchange rate and rice price as per appeal.

(b) 1998 Exchange rate.

(c) 1999 Rice price.

(d) 1998 Exchange rate, 1999 rice price.

To emphasise the difficulty of accurately projecting BBC's expenditure, the following table shows how expenditure forecasts in previous years have compared with actual expenditures. Since 1993 BBC has been making its first estimates of annual expenditures in August of the previous year, updating this in February of the year in consideration and then further refining this in again after the mid-year point, in August.

BBC Expenditure Forecasts Compared with Actual Expenditures

Year	First Budget (August)		1 st Revision (February)		2 nd Revision (August)		Actual Expenditures
	Baht (m)	% actual	Baht (m)	% actual	Baht (m)	% Actual	
2003	727		707				
2002	565	97	562	97	561	97	581
2001	535	109	535	109	522	106	493
2000	524	115	515	113	465	102	457
1999	542	113	522	109	476	99	481
1998	330	72	494	107	470	102	461
1997	225	77	238	82	269	92	292
1996	170	83	213	104	213	104	204
1995	96	54	124	69	161	90	179
1994	85	87	93	95	91	93	98
1993	80	93	90	105	75	87	86
1992			75	99			76
1991			50	81			62
1990			24	71			34
Average		90%		95%		97%	

It can be seen that in some years budget estimates were seriously underestimated because of unforeseen events, although on average by not more than 10%. The accuracy of the revised forecasts obviously improves as events unfold.

7. FINANCIAL REPORTS FOR SECOND HALF OF 2002

The following tables summarise the BBC programme financial accounts for the period July to December 2002.

Table 7.1 presents a summary of income, expenditures and balances for the period. This table is also produced monthly for the information of the BBC Board.

Table 7.1a gives a breakdown of programme expenditures by office; **7.1b** a breakdown of management expenses; **7.1c** a statement of stock held at the beginning and end of the period; **7.1c** a breakdown of the medical agencies' expenditure of BBC grants for supplementary feeding; and **7.1d** a statement of BBC's property.

Tables 7.2a-c present the information in Table 7.1 in a different format, allocating individual donor contributions to the main expenditure categories. Table **7.2a** covers the previous reporting period July to December 2001 as given in the last BBC Report. Table **7.2b** covers the current reporting period January to June 2002. Table **7.2c** shows total expenditures for the period July 2001 to June 2002. Funds accepted for specific purposes or which have to be expended fully within the current six-month period are listed separately as designated donations in Table 7.2a-c, with expenditures allocated appropriately. All undesignated donations including balances carried forward are assumed to carry a proportionate share of the remaining expenses incurred in each category. Should any donor require further breakdown beyond the expenditure categories given, this can be extracted by using the details given in **Table 7.1**.

During this 6-month period the allocation of funds was problematic because large grants designated for expenditures on rice beginning in the first half of the year only arrived during the second half. This meant that designated rice expenditures had to be allocated to other (wrong) donors in the first half of the year. This was corrected during the second six months by re-allocating former rice expenditure allocations to other items. The total 12 month allocation in **Table 7.2c** gives the correct picture for the year as a whole. In future years any similar adjustment will be highlighted when the first allocations are made.

Generally BBC undertakes to expend all grants within a 12-month period. Balances carried forward at the end of this period will be spent and accounted for during the next 6-month period, i.e. by 30th June 2003.

The BBC financial year is from July until June and BBC accounts are audited annually. The Financial Statements and Audit Report of KPMG Audit (Thailand) for the period 1st July 2001 through 30th June 2002 were presented in the last report.

Table 7.1

Table 7.1a

Table 7.1b

Table 7.1c

Table 7.1d, e

Table 7.2a

Table 7.2b

Table 7.2c

APPENDIX A

THE BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM

a) 1984 Mandate/Organisation

In February 1984 the Ministry of Interior (MOI) invited Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working with Indochinese refugees in Thailand to provide emergency assistance to around 9,000 Karen refugees who sought refuge in Tak Province. The situation was expected to be temporary and MOI stressed the need to restrict aid to essential levels only. It was emphasised that nothing should be done which might encourage refugees to come to Thailand or stay any longer than necessary. Thailand was prepared to offer these people temporary asylum on humanitarian grounds.

On 4th/5th March 1984, several Bangkok-based NGO representatives visited the border to assess the situation. The NGO representatives all happened to be from Christian Agencies and observed that several French NGOs (MSF, MAP, MDM) were already setting up medical facilities, whilst the refugees themselves were cutting building materials from the surrounding forest to build their own houses. The immediate need was food supplies. The NGOs concluded that needs were quite small and, since it was expected that the refugees would return home at the beginning of the rainy season, it would be best to work together rather than try to divide the work up or to compete with each other. They agreed to open a bank account into which each agency would contribute funds and operate a programme under the name of the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA)

The refugees could not go back in the rainy season and the CCA became the main supplier of food and relief supplies to the refugees. It was an informal organisation and different NGOs joined and left, contributing funds and sharing in the decision making. The name was changed to the Burmese Border Consortium (BBC) in 1991 to become more inclusive, accessing a broader range of donors.

The NGOs involved in setting up the initial assistance programmes decided to work through the Karen Refugee Committee, which the Karen authorities had established to oversee the refugee population. In order to avoid duplication and competition, they established a subcommittee under the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) to coordinate the relief programme. The CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee met for the first time in April 1984 and there have been monthly coordination meetings every since. All agencies providing assistance or interested in the situation are invited. The MOI sets policy and administrates the assistance programmes through CCSDPT.

b) 1990 Expansion/1991 Regulations

During 1989 the NGOs were approached by the Karenni Refugee Committee to assist Karenni Refugees who had fled fighting in Karenni State to Mae Hong Son Province. Early in 1990 Mon and Karen refugees also began to arrive in Kanchanaburi Province from Mon State. Another relief programme was set up at the request of the Mon National Relief Committee.

Assistance to each of the new groups was provided on the same basis as that already given to the Karen, through the respective refugee committees. In August 1990 the Agencies informed the MOI of these extended programmes and in November the name of the CCSDPT Karen Subcommittee was changed to the CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee.

In 1991 the NGOs sought formal permission from the Thai authorities to provide assistance to all of the ethnic groups throughout four border provinces. On 31st May 1991 the Agencies were given written approval to provide assistance under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and in accordance with their guidelines (see Appendix B). The guidelines confirmed earlier informal understandings, limiting assistance to food, clothing and medicine, restricting agency staff to the minimum necessary and requiring monthly requests to be submitted through the CCSDPT.

Three NGOs provided assistance under this agreement. The Burmese Border Consortium focused on food and relief item supplies. The BBC provided around 95% of all of these items and the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR) provided most of the balance. Medicins Sans Frontiers (MSF) was the main medical agency working under agreement with the MOI.

c) 1994 Regulations

During 1992 and 1993, a number of other CCSDPT Member agencies were providing services on the border in coordination with approved programmes, with the tacit approval of the MOI, but without a formal mandate. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee requested formal recognition of these programmes and official approval for an extension of services to include sanitation and education. At a meeting with NGOs, international organisations and embassies on 18th May 1994, MOI confirmed that sanitation and education services would be permitted and also announced that all agencies should re-submit their programmes for formal approval via CCSDPT.

An NGO/MOI Burma Working Group was set up and meetings were held to establish new operational procedures. NGOs were required to submit formal programme proposals, apply for border passes for authorised personnel, and to submit quarterly reports via the provincial authorities. All of the CCSDPT member agencies with current border activities were given approval for their programmes.

The programme approvals for 1995 included sanitation projects. The CCSDPT Burma Subcommittee carried out a survey of educational needs in 1995/6 and the first education project proposals were approved in 1997.

d) 1997 CCSDPT Restructuring and RTG Emergency Procedures

With the Indochinese refugee caseload almost gone, CCSDPT was restructured for 1997. CCSDPT was now principally engaged with Burmese refugees, making the Burma Subcommittee redundant. The former Burma Medical and Education Working Groups were upgraded to Subcommittee status to coordinate activities in these fields.

During 1997 refugees arrived in sensitive areas of Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Provinces. NGOs were required to submit requests for monthly supplies for these areas for MOI approval in the normal way, but these now also had to be approved by the 9th Infantry Division of the Royal Thai 1st Army. The 9th Infantry Division is able to override MOI approval and on occasion exercises this prerogative.

e) 1998/99 Role for UNHCR

During the first half of 1998 the Royal Thai Government made the decision to give UNHCR an operational role on the Burmese border for the first time and letters of agreement were exchanged in July. The UNHCR established a presence on the border during the second half of 1998 and became fully operational in the early part of 1999 with the opening and staffing of three offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot and Kanchanaburi. The UNHCR role is principally one of monitoring and protection. It has no permanent offices in the camps, which continue to be administered by the Thai authorities themselves with the assistance of the Refugee Committees. The NGOs continue to provide and coordinate relief services to the refugee camps under bilateral agreements with RTG as before, although UNHCR may provide complementary assistance especially regarding camp relocations.

The structure of the relief assistance and location of CCSDPT member agency services are shown in the diagrams.

f) BBC Organisational Structure

Various agencies have joined and left the Burmese Border Consortium over the years. Current members and the year in which they joined BBC are as follows:

TBMF	Thailand Baptist Missionary Fellowship (1984)
ZOA	Refugee Care Netherlands (1984)
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service (1990)
DIAKONIA	DIAKONIA, Sweden (1999)
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid (2002)

The BBC structure was informal until 1996 with the member agencies directing the programme by consensus. With the programme growing inexorably and becoming increasingly dependent on governmental funding, a need for greater transparency and accountability led to BBC adopting a formal organisational structure for 1997. This structure was discussed and agreed at the first Donors Meeting held in Amsterdam on 2nd/3rd December 1996.

Structure of Relief Assistance

The structure comprises:

- The Donors Meeting, being the overall representative body of BBC.
- An Advisory Committee, elected from the Donors at the Donors Meeting, representing the Donors Meeting between meetings.
- The BBC Board, being the five member agencies responsible for overall management of the programme.
- The BBC Director appointed by the Board and responsible for implementation of the programme.

Full details are set down in the "Structure and Regulations of BBC" available from the BBC office.

The Donors Meeting meets once per year, the Advisory Committee meets between Donors Meetings to follow up on concerns of the Meeting and to assist the Board on outstanding problems. The Board meets monthly to oversee the programme. The Governance structure of BBC will be subject to an evaluation by an independent Consultant in February 2003.

The BBC shares an office with CCSDPT at 12/5 Convent Road. The BBC Board and Staff are listed at the beginning of this report. The field coordinators traditionally worked from offices at their homes with some storage space for emergency relief items, but separate offices were opened in Mae Sot and Mae Sariang in 1998 and in Kanchanaburi in 2000. BBC will open another office in Mae Hong Son Province in 2003.

g) Funding Sources

BBC received funds from the following sources in 2002:

ACT Netherlands	Diakonia
Baptist International Ministries	EC Uprooted People's Fund
Baptist Missionary Society ,UK	ICCO
Bread for the World, Germany	Ireland Aid
CAFOD, UK	International Rescue Committee
Caritas Australia	International Refugee Trust
Caritas Germany	Inter-Pares, Canada
Caritas Hong Kong	Jesuit Refugee Service
Caritas Japan	Misereor
Caritas Switzerland	National Council of Churches in Australia
Christian Aid, UK	Norwegian Church Aid
Church World Service, USA	Open Society Institute
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship	United Society for Propagation of the Gospel
DanChurchAid, Denmark	ZOA Refugee Care Netherlands

The Governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, European Union, Great Britain, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands and USA contribute over 85% of BBC's funds. These funds are all channelled through these Donors. Appendix F sets out details of funding received from all Donors since 1984.

Until mid-1997 the BBC member agencies transferred funds received from the Donors to a programme account held by TBMF, but in 1997 BBC was able to open its own bank accounts. Donations are now made direct to the BBC Bangkok account.

h) BBC Bank Account

The BBC bank account for grant transfers is as follows:

Siam Commercial Bank	Branch Ref No: 14-064
Surawong 2 Branch	Name: Burmese Border Consortium
141 Sakulthai Bldg-Surawong Tower	Account #: 064-2-15287-3
Surawong Road, Bangrak	Swift ID Code: SICOTHBK
Bangkok 10500, Thailand	

The BBC Tax ID number is: 4-1070-5787-5

CCSDPT Agency Services

i) Financial Statements and Programme Updates

The BBC produces monthly income and expenditure statements and a summary report every six months. The BBC financial year is 1 July to 30 June and accounts are audited annually. The Auditors' report for the period 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 was presented in the last 6-month report (August 2002).

The six-monthly reports include a narrative explaining the major events during the period. However many donors require more regular information, especially during emergencies. Situation updates are sent out by e-mail and 9 were issued in 2002.

j) Programme Philosophy

The BBC adopted formal aims and objectives at the first Donors Meeting in December 1996 and these were revised at the Oslo Donors Meeting in September 2000. These have now been revised again to incorporate gender and refugee participation and are set out at the beginning of this Report. Although the main components of these changes were presented to the Ottawa Donors Meeting in October these have yet to be ratified.

k) Coordination with Refugee Committees

The BBC provides all assistance in coordination with the refugee committees of each of the three main ethnic groups: the Karen Refugee Committee based in Mae Sot; the Karenni Refugee Committee based in Mae Hong Son; and the Mon Relief and Development Committee (formerly the Mon National Relief Committee until 1999) based in Sangkhlaburi. Each of these three committees report to BBC each month recording assistance received both from BBC and other sources, refugee population statistics, and issues of concern.

APPENDIX B

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR REGULATIONS

31st May 1991

(Approximate Translation)

Re: The provision of assistance to Burmese Minorities who have fled into Thailand.

To: CCSDPT

This is in regard to the CCSDPT's request for permission for humanitarian agencies to provide medicines, food and items of necessity to minorities of Burma who have fled into Thailand for reasons related to human rights, in the border areas of Mae Hong Son, Tak, Kanchanaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Provinces.

The National Security Council raised this matter in a meeting of the governmental bodies concerned on 25th April 1991. It was decided at the meeting that the Ministry of Interior would outline a procedure for the supervision of relief agencies in the provision of assistance to minorities, according to guidelines established.

Having considered the matter, the MOI has come up with the following procedure:

1. Private organisations that intend to provide assistance to Burmese minorities in Thai-Burmese border areas in Mae Hong Son, Tak, Kanchanaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan Province must submit a proposal to the MOI through the CCSDPT every time (assistance is given).
2. The CCSDPT will submit proposals to the MOI requesting permission for relief agencies to provide assistance. The following details are to be included.
 - 2.1 The quantities of goods to be provided.
 - 2.2 The number and names of staff members involved.
 - 2.3 The exact period during which the assistance is to be provided, including the correct month, day and year.
3. The MOI will consider the requests and instruct the Office of the Governor as follows:
 - 3.1 To assess the suitability of the location in which activities are to be carried out. The location must be inside Thailand. Activities must be carried out with caution and in suitable areas. In areas which are unsafe for relief agency staff, or where the security of Thailand is threatened, the MOI may withhold permission to proceed.
 - 3.2 Assistance may be given to civilians only and there is to be no publicity.
 - 3.3 The social and psychological effects on (citizens of) the Kingdom of Thailand in the areas concerned must be taken into consideration. If necessary, assistance will have to be provided to the Kingdom of Thailand as well.
 - 3.4 Assistance is to be limited to food, clothing and medicines. Medicines and medical supplies must pass the inspection of the Provincial Health Office for determination of their suitability.
 - 3.5 Relief agency staff are to be kept to a minimum and will not be allowed to reside on site. In cases where large numbers of personnel are required, there should be coordination with the Provincial Office so that Provincial Office employees may be included.
4. The MOI will inform the CCSDPT of its decision every time (a request is made), after which time permission will be granted for direct coordination with the Provincial Office.
5. If any relief agency fails to follow the steps outlined above, the MOI will immediately revoke permission to proceed.

Respectfully,

Nai Chamnan Pochana
Assistant Deputy Minister
For the Deputy Interior Ministry

APPENDIX C

A Brief History of the Burmese Border Situation

The adjoining maps illustrate how the situation on the Thai/Burmese border has developed since BBC became involved in 1984.

1. Border Control Before 1984. Back in 1984 the border was predominately under the control of the ethnic nationalities whose home this had been for millennia. The Burmese Government/Army had only three main access points at Tachilek/Mae Sai in the North, Myawaddy/Mae Sot in the centre and Kawthaung/Ranong in the South. The shaded border areas had never been under the direct control of the Burmese Government or occupied by Burmese Army. Instead, these areas were controlled by the ethnic nationalities themselves, predominantly Shan, Karenni, Karen and Mon, who had established *de facto* autonomous states. They raised taxes on substantial black market trade between Thailand and Burma and used these taxes to pay for their governing systems, their resistance armies and some social services. Burma was in self-imposed economic isolation, dependent on this black market trade for its daily needs. The ethnic groups imported everyday consumer goods into Burma and natural resources into Thailand, mainly timber, cattle and precious stones.

2. 1984: The First Refugees. In 1984 the Karen National Union (KNU) had been in rebellion for 35 years and since the mid-1970s had been under attack, increasingly being pushed back towards the Thai border. For several years dry season offensives had sent thousands of refugees temporarily into Thailand only to return in the rainy season when the Burmese Army withdrew. But in 1984 the Burmese launched a massive offensive, which broke through the Karen front lines opposite Tak Province, sending about 10,000 refugees into Thailand. This time the Burmese Army was able to maintain its front-line positions and did not withdraw in the rainy season. The refugees remained in Thailand.

3. 1984 to 1994: The Border Under Attack. Over the next ten years the Burmese Army launched annual dry season offensives, taking control of new areas, building supply routes and establishing new bases. As territory was lost new refugees fled to Thailand, increasing to about 80,000 by 1994. However even then, the ethnic-controlled buffer area still more or less existed.

4. January 1995: The Fall of Manerplaw. The beginning of the end came in January 1995 when, with the assistance of the breakaway Democratic Karen Buddhist Association, the Burmese Army attacked and overran the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw. Manerplaw had become the headquarters for other Burmese pro-democracy groups by this time as well as umbrella ethnic organisations.

5. 1995 to 1997: The Buffer Falls. The fall of Manerplaw was disastrous for the KNU and as they attempted to re-group, the Burmese Army was able to overrun all their other bases along the Moei River, enabling them to take control of this important central section of the border opposite Tak Province. In 1995 the Burmese Army broke a short-lived cease-fire agreement with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and in 1996 similarly overran all of their bases, taking control of the border opposite Mae Hong Province. And in the same year, Khun Sa, leader of the Shan resistance made a deal with SLORC which paralysed the Shan resistance and effectively allowed the Burmese Army access to the northern border opposite Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces. Finally, in 1997, the Burmese Army launched a huge dry season offensive over-running the remainder of Karen controlled territory from opposite Tak Province all the way south to Prachuap Khiri Kan. In three short years the Burmese army had effectively overran the entire Thai border which, for the first time in history, they now had tenuous access to and control over. The ethnic nationalities no longer controlled any significant tract of territory and the number of refugees had increased to around 115,000.

6. Forced Village Relocations Since 1996. Once the Burmese Army began taking control of former ethnic territory it launched a massive relocation plan aimed at consolidating its bases, bringing the population under military control and eliminating the ethnic resistance. The map shows the vast areas where the Burmese Army has forced villagers to move to relocation sites and then destroyed their former homes. According to a report compiled by BBC in October 2002 at least 2,500 ethnic villages have been destroyed affecting a million people. More than 200,000 have fled to Thailand as refugees (although the majority is Shan and not recognised as refugees by the Thai Government). BBC estimates that around 370,000 people have been forced to move to around 180 relocation sites and another 270,000 Internally Displaced People are still in the eastern Burma border areas in temporary shelters or on the run. Meanwhile the population of the border refugee camps has increased to around 144,000.

Brief History

APPENDIX D

THE RELIEF PROGRAMME

a) Royal Thai Government Regulations

Each month the BBC submits lists to MOI, detailing supplies to be delivered to each camp the following month, including expected delivery dates. Copies are forwarded to the Provincial and District Authorities. The MOI sends approval to the BBC and to the Provincial Offices, which in turn notify the District Authorities.

Under regulations introduced in 1994 the BBC submits the overall programme to MOI for approval annually. The BBC submits quarterly programme reports to the Provincial Offices and six-monthly reports to the MOI. All BBC field staff carry camp passes issued by the MOI.

b) Food Rations

The refugee diet is traditionally rice, salt, and fish paste, supplemented with leaves and roots gathered from the forest, plus any vegetables that can be cultivated. For many years the refugees were not entirely dependent on the relief programme for food and showed commendable willingness to be self-sufficient where possible. Their political organisations still controlled territory on the Burmese side of the border, traded on the black market, and grew crops in some areas. Some refugees were also able to get low-paid seasonal work in Thailand, forage in the surrounding forest, keep small kitchen gardens and raise a limited amount of livestock in the camps. At the beginning of the relief programme in 1984, BBC's aim was to cover only around 50 percent of the staple diet needs. At this level life in the camps remained simple and poor, but not inconsistent with standards in their former villages, or in Thai villages in the area.

Over the years the ethnic groups lost their territory to the Burmese Army and the security situation deteriorated. The refugee camps became subject to tighter controls by the Thai authorities and it became increasingly difficult for the refugees to be self-sufficient. Rations were gradually increased and by the mid-1990's it had become necessary to supply 100 percent of basic food needs. During 1997 even stricter controls were placed on the camps for security reasons and, in some cases, it became impossible for refugees to leave the camps to forage or get work. NGOs became concerned that the refugees were no longer getting an adequate diet and in October 1997 the BBC commissioned a rapid assessment of the nutritional adequacy of the rations.

BBC rations were compared with the new WFP/UNHCR guidelines for planning estimates for populations that recommended providing a minimum of 2,100 Kcal per person per day based on an average family, with no differentiation for age. The conclusion was that the standard food basket should include mung beans and cooking oil for all the camps to ensure the minimum average of 2,100 kcal, and this was implemented during the first half of 1998. The current standard monthly BBC rations are:

Rice	16 kg/adult: 8 kg/child <5 years
Fish Paste	1 kg/person
Salt	330 g/person
Mung Beans	1.5 kg/adult: 750 gm/child <5 years
Cooking Oil	1 lt/adult: 500 ml/child <5 years

There are some variations in the rations given to individual camps based on local preferences, but the above composition provides 2,250 kcals per person day.

The BBC food basket was designed to cover only the basic energy and protein needs of the refugees and does not ensure adequate provision of many important micronutrients. It was assumed in the past that the refugees supplemented BBC rations by buying, bartering, growing or foraging to make up for any other needs. But as the refugees have become more aid-dependent the BBC recognised that some segments of the population at least, may be at risk for deficiencies.

In 2001 BBC conducted food consumption/nutrition status surveys in Mae La camp and Karenni Camp 2, and in May 2002 a rapid nutrition survey was carried out in Tham Hin, Ban Don Yang and Umpiem Mai camps. The results showed quite consistently that the ration currently provided is proportionately too high in carbohydrates at the expense of protein and fat, and low in many micronutrients. The refugees are not able to adequately supplement the BBC ration with other foods to compensate and are much more dependent on BBC ration food than was previously assumed.

BBC is currently recommending changes to the food basket, which will include the addition of blended food, with some reduction in rice and mung beans. BBC has initiated collaboration with the medical agencies to expand nutrition surveillance activities in the camps, and the surveillance activities will be reflected in border-wide statistics during 2003.

c) Supplementary Feeding

Currently the medical agencies run supplementary feeding programmes for three targeted vulnerable groups: malnourished children; pregnant and lactating women; and tuberculosis patients. The budget for ingredients is provided by the BBC and includes rice, eggs, dried fish, beans, sugar, milk powder, vegetable oil, and fresh fruits and vegetables. The BBC provides/reimburses the basic supplies for the supplementary feeding programmes run by AMI, ARC, IRC, MHD and MSF.

The supplementary feeding programmes were evaluated by a consultant provided by Dutch Interchurch Aid in May 1998 and the main conclusions were that the programmes and target groups were justified, the current food items covered by BBC were appropriate and phasing out was not yet appropriate. It was felt not necessary to include other vulnerable groups at that time. The evaluation noted different approaches adopted by the medical agencies and, whilst not advocating any particular model, recommended them to jointly review their different protocols and harmonise their programmes within reasonable boundaries. It also recommended greater interchange between agencies to share experiences and tabled a suggested new format for reporting the programmes.

Since late 2000, the BBC Nutritionist has been working with the Medical agencies to follow up on the evaluation recommendations. Further study showed that there were significant variations in both the quantities of foods provided and the criteria for entrance into and exit from the programmes. Since the evaluation, the majority of them have phased out wet feeding centres for malnourished children and integrated the programs into their Reproductive Health activities. Thus, supplementary feeding programs for malnourished children have already been 'exited'. The BBC Nutritionist and medical agencies have agreed that the feedings targeting pregnant and lactating women and tuberculosis patients are justified and should be continued.

Thus far, more comprehensive, reporting forms and standardised entrance and exit criteria have been introduced to the medical agencies. In the coming year, standardised feeding protocols will be encouraged on a border-wide basis that increase the amounts provided to pregnant and lactating women and moderately malnourished children according to MSF and WHO guidelines to account for sharing within the households. Additionally, BBC will initiate follow-up with the medical agencies and explore potential monitoring activities that can be conducted by the nutrition assistant.

Figure D.2 presented in Appendix D shows that malnutrition rates in the camps, by feeding enrolment, remain extremely low. These figures reflect only the numbers of children enrolled in the supplementary feeding program. Data from nutrition surveys and CCSDPT common data will provide more accurate information on true rates of malnutrition in the camps.

d) Blankets, Bednets and Sleeping Mats

The main relief supplies are bednets and blankets. With malaria and respiratory diseases being major health problems, these items are essential. They have to be supplied and replaced on a regular basis because they wear out rapidly with heavy use and rough conditions in crowded bamboo houses. Major distributions are usually made once each year.

Impregnated bednets were introduced in 1997, following recommendations made by the Sho Khlo Malaria Research Unit (SMRU) and the CCSDPT Health Subcommittee. Malaria transmission rates in the camps have fallen dramatically since then and the use of impregnated nets was phased out of Tak and Mae Hong Son camps during 2000 and 2001 and in Tham Hin and Ban Don Yang camps in 2002. All camps will be supplied with non-impregnated nets in 2003.

Sleeping mats were traditionally supplied only when requested by the Refugee Committees. During 1998 it was agreed that these mats should be distributed more methodically to ensure that all refugees use them in conjunction with the bednets. It was noted that households not using them were vulnerable to mosquitoes entering the nets from underneath their houses. Household surveys were conducted and additional distributions undertaken. The current policy is to carry out a full distribution of sleeping mats every two years and the next full distribution will be in 2003.

The normal distribution rate is one blanket for every two refugees, one family size bednet and one sleeping mat per three persons. These items are usually also given to all new refugees on arrival as necessary.

Other emergency needs are addressed from time to time particularly during camp evacuations, fighting and camp relocations. Items have included plastic sheeting, water drums, cooking and eating utensils.

e) Cooking Utensils

The refugees traditionally have taken care of their own miscellaneous household needs but this has become increasingly problematic as their ability to work and forage has become very limited. By the end of 2000 it was observed that there were not enough cooking pots in the camps and many households were using very old ones. A distribution of pots was made to all households early in 2001 at the rate of one pot per family with a larger size pot provided for families with more than five people. These needs will be periodically reviewed.

f) Building Materials

In the past, building materials were not usually supplied, although roofing was given when camps had to be moved out of season and the materials were difficult to find. In 1997, however, the authorities began to prohibit the cutting of bamboo in some areas and BBC started to provide all essential construction materials for the new sites created during camp consolidations.

Early in 2000 the Thai authorities also asked BBC to supply materials for housing repairs in all camps since they were concerned that the refugees were still depleting the local forests. During the year bamboo and eucalyptus poles were supplied to most camps and thatch or roofing leaves to some. During 2001 BBC increased the amount of materials supplied and extended distributions to all camps, but there were still inconsistencies and difficulties obtaining good and consistent quality materials in some areas. In response to the protection workshops BBC is committed to providing sufficient materials for building new houses and repairs. New sources of supply are being identified and for 2003 BBC plans to introduce standard rations for all camps as follows:

1. New Houses

Material	Standard House (1 to 5 persons)	Large House (>5 persons)
Eucalyptus poles	12 poles: 8 large, 4 small	18 poles: 12 large, 6 small
Bamboo	200 poles: 100 large, 100 small	300 poles: 150 large, 150 small
Roofing	300 leaves or 100-200 thatch	450 leaves or 200-300 thatch

2. Repairs to Old Houses

Material	Standard House (1 to 5 persons)	Large House (>5 persons)
Bamboo	50 poles: 25 large, 25 small	75 poles: 40 large, 35 small
Roofing	100 leaves or 30-50 thatch	150 leaves or 50-100 thatch

Thatch ration depends on type and density of thatch.

g) Clothing

BBC did not provide clothing to the refugees for many years, but since 1995 World Concern and Lutheran World Relief (LWR) started sending shipments of used clothing, sweaters and quilts. Most refugees were able to receive at least one item of clothing most years. As the refugees become more aid-dependent there has a growing need for clothing, especially warm clothing for the cold season, and since 2001 BBC has been trying to ensure regular distributions.

The Shanti Volunteer Association (SVA) has been established as a major new source, supplying good quality jackets/sweaters from Japan. In 2002 BBC was able to receive shipments from both SVA and LWR in time for the cold season, ensuring that each refugee received at least two pieces of clothing. (World Concern was no longer able to supply large enough quantities of used clothing to make the bureaucracy involved worthwhile.)

Since 2002 BBC has also supported a new longyi-weaving project organised by the women's organisations (Burmese style wrap-around 'skirt', worn by both men and women). BBC supplies thread and funds for the women's groups to make one longyi for every woman and man in alternative years. In 2002 the project made one longyi for every woman in the camps and in 2003 they will be made for men.

h) Cooking Fuel

When camps started to be consolidated in 1995, BBC was asked to supply cooking fuel to Mae La camp in order to lessen environmental damage caused by refugees gathering wood from the surrounding forest. After researching alternative types of cooking fuel, BBC began supplying Mae La with compressed sawdust logs in September 1995. Similar logs had been used in other refugee camps in Thailand.

BBC experimented with sawdust log rations and gradually increased them to 11 kg/person/month by the end of 1997. The logs became a major expense and during 1998 BBC tried out new forms of logs, principally charcoal sawdust logs and bamboo charcoal. These were well received by the refugees and more efficient to use. In Karenni Camp 3 the Karenni Refugee Committee also taught refugees to manufacture their own charcoal logs using rice husk ash and off-cut bamboo ash.

With increasing concerns for the environment and restrictions on refugee movements, more and more camps were supplied with cooking fuel each year and, since early 2000, all camps have been provided with 'full' rations. Cooking fuel became BBC's second largest expenditure after rice. But even after 'full' rations had been introduced, the Thai authorities still complained that the refugees were destroying the local forests and asked BBC to increase the rations by as much as 100%. BBC decided that it needed expert advice to determine optimum rations more scientifically and to help assess the efficiency of the available products.

In April/May 2000 UNHCR commissioned a consultant to work in cooperation with BBC to study the needs for cooking fuel in the camps, how it was being used, what alternatives were available and how the rations might be adjusted. The consultant concluded that there was a need for increased rations but that improving fuel quality, supplying efficient cooking stoves throughout the border and improving cooking techniques could reduce the overall need. He also recommended experimenting with much cheaper, commercially available firewood. Meanwhile the consultant recommended an increase in the ration by an average of 7%, to be simultaneously implemented by introducing variable rations according to family size which BBC had already introduced in some of the camps.

BBC is now distributing variable rations according to the family size. A family of two people receives an average 10 kgs per person per month, whereas a family of five people receives an average of seven kgs per person. Overall the average ration is just over seven kgs/person per month. The energy content of all charcoal is now tested and the most energy efficient selected.

An experiment was conducted with firewood in Tham Hin camp in 2000/1 where 50% of energy requirements were supplied with charcoal and 50% with firewood. This was very successful. The firewood proved acceptable to the camp committee, refugees and local Thai authorities and saved BBC about 34% on fuel costs compared with supplying 100% charcoal. During 2002 BBC increased the firewood proportion of fuel in Tham Hin to 70:30 at the request of MOI and also extended the experiment to Umpiem Mai and Karenni Camp 3 to test the availability and acceptance of firewood in other provinces.

Unfortunately the extension of this experiment has not been successful. Tham Hin residents complain that the firewood component there is too high and the committees have problems in ensuring equitable distributions. There are problems with consistency and storage of supplies. The residents of Umpiem Mai complain of fire risk due to high winds experienced in that camp and the experiment in Karenni Camp 3 had to be abandoned when the camp was relocated to Camp 2. Experimentation is continuing but it seems unlikely now that firewood can be extended to other camps.

i) Educational Supplies

The refugees sustain all community activities themselves including schools from kindergarten through to high school. Until 1997 BBC made annual donations of basic school supplies for the teachers and pupils, mostly purchased by ZOA. During 1995/6 the BBC staff organised a survey of educational needs in the Mon, Karenni and Karen camps on behalf of the CCSDPT. The results of the survey were presented to the MOI in August 1996 setting out recommendations for extended education services for the refugees. Now there are eleven NGOs, including two BBC Members (ZOA, JRS), providing education services in the camps and ZOA distributes school supplies under its own programme.

j) Emergency Stock

BBC's aims to have staff in the area within 24 hours of any emergency situation such as an influx of new arrivals, flood or fire damage. An assessment will then be carried out where possible (i.e., where there is no security risk) in coordination with the medical agencies, a member of the refugee community and the local Thai Authorities.

In order to be able to 'respond' quickly to an emergency, it was agreed in June 2002, that an 'emergency stock' of basic non-food items will be maintained as follows:

Area	To Cover No. of families	Blankets	Bednets	Plastic Sheeting	Plastic Rolls	Cooking Pots 26 cm	Cooking Pots 28 cm
Mae Hong Son	100	500	200	100	25	100	100
Mae Sariang	100	500	200	100	25	100	100
Tak	400	2,000	750	200	50	400	400
Kanchanaburi	100	500	100	100	25	100	100

k) Refugee Demographics

The supplies are distributed to all camp residents. The breakdown by age and sex reported by the Karen, Mon and Karenni Committees in December 2002 was as follows:

Group	Families	Adult*		Children		Total
		Male	Female	Male	Female	
Karen	18,071	32,085	30,556	19,629	18,810	101,080
Mon	2,189	3,694	3,853	1,791	1,864	11,202
Karenni	4,333	6,597	5,846	4,404	4,221	21,068
Total	24,593	42,376	40,255	25,824	24,895	133,350

* For Karen and Mon, this is over 12 years old, for Karenni over 14 years old.

l) Assistance to Thai Communities

It has always been the policy of BBC to provide assistance to Thai communities in the vicinity of the refugee camps where there are real needs. This is in recognition of the fact that there are poor communities which do not have access to any other assistance and which may feel neglected when support is given to refugees in their area. Assistance given was ad hoc, but over the years the BBC provided educational supplies to Thai schools, distributed blankets during the cool season, and assisted many times with flood relief. The BBC also provided compensation to local communities affected by the location of the refugee camps in their area, and assisted the local Thai authorities with the cost of repairing roads near the refugee camps.

The number of requests for assistance by Thai communities and local Thai authorities increased dramatically in 1998, partly because local administration budgets were slashed due to Thailand's economic crisis. In 1999 the BBC established a more formal but still general policy for responding to such requests. The policy specifies potential beneficiaries for assistance including: disasters and emergencies in the border Provinces; communities directly affected by the refugee populations; other border communities whose standard of living is equal or less than that of the refugees; and Thai agencies providing security or assistance which are not adequately funded by the authorities. The policy also sets out procedures for submitting requests.

Total assistance given to Thai communities during the second half of 2002 was baht 3,176,119 as detailed in Table 7.1a. Most of this, baht 2,357,193 was given to local Thai authorities, mainly in the form of rice to border personnel. Baht 346,860 was spent on emergency requests and 472,066 on development projects.

A significant proportion of the used clothing distributions is also given to affected Thai communities.

m) Purchasing Procedures/Tendering

Traditionally, all food items were purchased in the border provinces, usually monthly, but sometimes rice was purchased in advance to secure good prices. The BBC monitored daily rice prices published in Bangkok, checked the local markets and compared the prices paid at the different locations along the border. All of the commodities BBC used were everyday items readily available in all markets and it was relatively straightforward to informally check value for money. Formal competitive quotations were obtained only occasionally when requested by large donors. Generally these confirmed that local suppliers could offer the lowest prices and the best service, mainly because frequent deliveries were required to many small camps with constantly changing road conditions and security situations.

The BBC programme was quite small in the early years but as it grew, it became very significant by local standards. Over time the better local suppliers geared themselves up to BBC's needs. In some cases they bought their own transportation and extended their storehouses. They got to know the local officials and became familiar with the topography. This enabled them to help solve administration blockages and to respond rapidly to frequent emergencies, getting their supplies to remote areas at very short notice. In some cases the suppliers organised annual road repairs into the camps at the end of the rainy season to enable their trucks to get in. In short, some local suppliers built up their operations to meet BBC's needs and had overwhelming advantages over other potential suppliers from a distance.

During 1999, however, mainly in response to tighter ECHO grant conditions, the BBC adopted formal bidding/contract procedures for rice and mung bean supplies in Tak Province. And in 2000 tendering was introduced for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and cooking fuel in all provinces. Bidding was open to all interested suppliers and it became more realistic for new suppliers to compete because there were far fewer camps to serve with better road access.

During 2001 BBC engaged an EURONAIID consultant to assist in upgrading its tendering and contracting procedures to meet exacting ECHO standards, including international bidding and the opening of bids before a tendering committee. Currently BBC is calling tenders on a regular six-monthly basis where camps are accessible all year round and separately for the rainy season where remote camps have to be stockpiled.

Miscellaneous supplies such as bamboo, roofing and cooking utensils are usually purchased locally, but large orders such as bednets, blankets, sleeping mats, are placed annually in Bangkok. Where possible, tenders are solicited from a minimum of three suppliers.

Regular tenders are now invited for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and charcoal and altogether BBC is now tendering for over 80% of all goods purchased. Most contracts have still so far been let to local companies. Experience with 'outside' suppliers has generally been problematic and BBC has adopted a policy to only award new suppliers with contracts to the less sensitive camps as a way of testing their ability. Tendering has undoubtedly reduced prices paid by BBC, but has created a huge administrative burden and deterioration in service to the refugees. An external consultant will review these procedures in 2003.

n) Transportation

Transportation costs are included in the price of all food supplies. In Tak Province transportation is usually by ten-wheel truck with a capacity of 400 50-kg rice sacks. For the other camps which are less accessible, transportation is usually by six-wheel trucks or 4-wheel drive pick-ups. The BBC staff organises the necessary permits from the local Thai authorities.

o) Delivery/Storage

The BBC itself does not store food. The suppliers keep their own stock and delivery is made direct to stores in the camps. BBC supplies building materials for the stores and the refugee Camp Committees are responsible for their construction and maintenance. The frequency of delivery varies by location. For Mae La camp in Tak Province, delivery is every two weeks, but for most of the other camps, delivery is usually monthly during the dry season. During the rainy season remote camps have to be stockpiled for up to seven months because they become inaccessible by truck. BBC staff arrange and check deliveries to camps. The Refugee Camp Committee check weights and quality on delivery, setting aside any deficient items. Delivery slips are carried by the truck drivers which are signed by the committee and returned to the BBC field office for checking. Delivery schedules are designed to ensure that new supplies arrive before the refugees have consumed the previous deliveries, with sufficient allowance for possible delays due to road conditions, breakdowns and other emergencies.

p) Distribution

The Refugee Camp Committees are responsible for the distribution of goods. Food distributions were traditionally organised by men because they had to carry 100 kgs sacks. However, during 2001, 50 kg sacks were introduced to all camps and women have been noticeably drawn into the unloading and distribution process. Distributions of household items, e.g., pots, bednets and clothing are often conducted with the assistance of women's organisations, teachers or health workers. Each family has a ration book stating their entitlement, and they are called to the delivery point for distribution. Whilst most are male-headed households, it is the women who usually collect the BBC rations. Amounts distributed are recorded on the camp records and on the ration cards. BBC introduced standard ration books in 2002/3. In some camps the ration books are retained by the camp committees but it is intended that refugees will keep the new ration books themselves.

q) Quality Control>Returns

Substandard supplies rejected by the camp committees are returned to the suppliers for replacement. Since the Refugee Committees are very familiar with the quality of supplies to be expected, generally in the past it was considered that appearance, smell and taste were adequate to assess quality. Rice and other food samples were submitted for testing by an independent inspection company only on an occasional basis.

However, independent quality control inspections are required under ECHO grant terms and in 2001 an independent inspection company was employed to check all rice, mung bean, cooking oil and charcoal deliveries to Mae La and Umpiem Mai camps.

The introduction of quality controls presented many logistical problems to begin with but these were soon resolved. Although most of the supplies easily pass the inspections, the checks have proven to be a useful safeguard, particularly when new suppliers are introduced and for stockpiling where the camp committees only check quality at the time of distribution. Independent quality control checks have now been introduced for all contracts for rice, mung beans, cooking oil and charcoal. Sample rates are still being experimented with and an independent consultant will evaluate the whole process in 2003.

r) Camp Administration

In the early years the Karen Refugee Committee took responsibility for all camp affairs and BBC provided no support for the Camp Administrations. As territory was lost and trading was hit, BBC agreed to allow the committees to retain some of the used sacks and containers for resale. The proceeds were then used to support administration expenses such as stationary, photocopying, plastic sheets and torch batteries for night security patrols, funerals, commemoration days, travel costs to town, entertainment of visitors and Thai authorities, camp festivals and social welfare for vulnerable families/individuals. As the amounts became more significant, BBC took responsibility for selling back the rice sacks and allocated funds to the committees. By 2000 about 70% of the credit received was given to the Camp Committees for their operating expenses.

With the introduction of polypropylene sacks in 2001, which have a resale value of only about one baht compared with up to 20 baht for a jute sack, this source of revenue drastically declined. From 2002 BBC started providing camp administrative support on a cash basis at a standard rate of baht 1.8 per refugee per month for each camp. This now appears as a budget line item. Camp committees now present monthly reports on these accounts and a summary of expenditure for all camps for the 6-month period, January to June 2002, is as follows:

Income (all camps)	baht		
Balance c/f from 2001	119,196		
Income from BBC	1,795,710		
Total Income	1,914,906		
Expenditure		%	Details
Admin/office costs	281,481	14	Miscellaneous office costs, entertainment, travel
Social Welfare	243,681	13	Individual support, funerals and weddings, special needs
Personal costs	251,072	13	Stipends for volunteers and committee members
Security costs	378,982	20	Communication equipment and supplies, wet weather clothing
Activity costs	530,662	27	Meetings, special activities, sports and cultural events
Other/miscellaneous	257,751	13	Misc. expenses including support for Thai Authorities and local villages
Total Expenditure	1,943,629	100	
Balance c/f	(28,723)		

s) Monitoring

The BBC staff monitor refugee population numbers, delivery and distribution of supplies on a continuous basis. This is done by regular crosschecks between information supplied by the refugee committees, the camp leaders and informal discussions with the refugees themselves, plus observation of deliveries, distribution and supplies in storage. A monitoring recording system has been in use since 1995 which provides a summary for each camp, detailing checks made on deliveries, quality, weight, distribution, camp recording systems, unusual events and frequency of staff visits. This has been constantly upgraded and can summarised as follows:

Summary of BBC Monitoring Process

Operation	Information Required	Primary Source	Verification by BBC
Calculating food required	Camp population and Population structure	Camp leaders	Periodic house counts
Procurement & Tendering	Bids from > 3 companies. Cost, Quality & Delivery Conditions	Rice shops, Newspapers, BBC staff	Prices monitored in Bangkok by BBC
Delivery	Quality and quantity	Camp leaders, Suppliers	Checks by independent inspection company prior to loading and/or samples taken by BBC Staff for testing. Delivery notes, etc
Storage	State of stores. Losses to pests	Camp leaders	Periodic visual inspection
Distribution	Amount distributed. Stock in hand	Camp registers, household ration books, summary forms	Periodic inspection of records including ration books. Periodic household interviews. Random weight checks at distribution points.

During the six month period from July to December 2002 the BBC field staff made 216 camp monitoring visits to the 10 camps in Thailand. This represents an increase of 40% compared to the previous six months and is due to recruitment of additional field assistants. This is an average of 3.6 visits to each camp or a total of 22 visits per camp, with a maximum of 40 visits (Mae La) and a minimum of 4 (Mae Ra Ma Luang and Karenni Camp 5).

In 2002, BBC started carrying out formal control checks of the distribution system to ensure that refugees are receiving their ration entitlement and to provide data for the performance indicators. The preparatory work for this was undertaken in 2001, entailing upgrading and standardising camp records and then testing the new checks in coordination with the refugees committees. Reporting and analysis of the new checks began April 2002. New 'Supply Receipt and Distribution Forms' were also introduced in the camps. These forms record overall distribution levels compared with the calculated ration entitlement of the population as a whole to determine the "distribution efficiency rating" level.

Summary information on the number of visits made, monitoring carried out, formal control checks and details of the distribution efficiency rating, for the period July to December 2002 are as follows:

Camp	Number of visits	Rice Sacks Rej ⁽¹⁾	Ration Books Checked ⁽²⁾		House Visits Made ⁽³⁾		Monitoring checks Made ⁽⁴⁾		Ave % Ration Received ⁽⁵⁾	% families ration as planned ⁽⁵⁾	Distribution Efficiency % Rate ⁽⁶⁾
			✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✓			
			Camp 2	30	0	0	48	3			
Camp 3	37	0	0	20	0	16	0	25	94	82	102.8
Camp 5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	No check carried out		87
MKK	13	0	0	10	0	13	2	16	100	100	98.5
MRML	4	0	0	20	0	2	3	10	101	100	100
Mae La	40	0	0	0	3	135	0	47	100	100	102
Umpiem	36	0	0	2	0	109	3	40	97.5	95	97
Nu Po	8	54	0	28	0	15	2	13	100	100	102
Tham Hin	29	0	0	141	0	184	3	68	83.5	37.5	98.5
Don Yang	15	0	0	100	0	72	0	26	98	82	99
Totals	216	54	0	369	6	560	13	285	97	98	98.5

- (1) Rice sacks rejected are recorded in monthly Camp Supply report forms completed at Godown.
- (2) Ration books are checked at the distribution points and during house visits. The check fails if there is any inaccuracy in the number of members of the household or the ration entitlement. Data for the last 6-month period is still not complete as staff are still discussing the frequency of checks.
- (3) Household visits are recorded as failed if it is clearly established that the family has not received supplies as planned.
- (4) Informal Monitoring checks are made in five main areas; at distribution, during delivery, in the store, on camp records and other supplies delivered (see below).
- (5) 20 families are selected at random at the distribution point and their ration weighed and checked against their entitlement. The % of families receiving rations as planned is the % receiving within + or -10% of their entitlement. Either of the two main commodities of rice or beans is checked.
- (6) Shows the accuracy of rice distribution, calculating actual needs of the registered camp population against what was distributed.

Out of 285 informal monitoring checks made (4) 13 checks required some kind of follow up or noted special attention. Typical examples of these extracted from the field monitoring sheets were, "Rice stores in Sections 6 & 8 of the camp need rebuilding after flood damage", "Firewood too long and charcoal rain damaged during transportation", "Met with new arrivals who were requesting needs for extra blankets", "First delivery of firewood to the camp late and firewood too green for immediate use".

Data collected during this period relating to ration books and household visits is not complete, as BBC is still assessing the frequency and accuracy of checks being made. Overall data received from the control checks carried out on the main commodities of rice and beans indicated that the distributions are made as planned. Any low figures shown in the "average % received" or "% of families receiving rations as planned" indicates that supplies ordered for that camp based on the population figures are not being distributed 'as planned by BBC'. The two main reasons for this appear to be that people are out of camp at the time of distribution or that new-born children have yet to be entered on ration cards. However details of actual rice distribution in the camp overall (with the exception of Camp 5) shows the distribution accuracy rating is within the + or - 5% acceptable field. The reason for the low accuracy rating in Camp 5 is still not clear and staff will be following up the situation over the next few months.

During this next period (January to July 2003) sample rates and coverage will be maintained at the current level, as systems to process, monitor and analyse the data are developed and improved. Staff will be assessing the needs for higher sample rates and coverage and making recommendations for the next six-month period.

t) Indicators

Since the 2000 Oslo Donors meeting, BBC has been committed to developing Performance Indicators to assess the achievement of the programme objectives. It was recognised that producing indicators to measure all aspects of BBC programme would take some time and during the first half of 2001 a logframe was developed to establish priority indicators for initial attention. These related to food distribution and all of these became available during 2002.

Having established the priority food indicators the Logframe has been extended in 2003 to include shelter, relief items, coordination of services, effects on Thai communities, gender, and refugee participation (see Section 3) The Performance Indicators available for the second half of 2002 are set out in Appendix F.

u) Cost Effectiveness

Although the BBC programme has grown enormously in the last few years, BBC continues to implement its programme as much as possible through the refugee's own committees and employs only 31 staff. Even though this represents a big increase in staff compared with just a few years ago, administrative expenses including all staff, office and vehicle expenses are 6% of expenditures in 2003. The total cost of the programme is still only equivalent to about baht 4,750 per refugee per year, or around baht 13 per refugee per day (US 30 cents per day at the current exchange rate of 42.5 baht/USD).

v) Gender

The majority of the camp populations arrived as a family unit. Most families have male headed households and the ratio of male to female is approximately 51: 49. The average family size is 5.4. Many village communities crossed the border at the same time or re-established themselves on arrival in the camps. Thus they have been able to maintain the structural support of their community and often the village head has become a section leader within the camp. Approximately 6% of households are single female headed households and it is the responsibility of the section leaders to ensure their needs are met during such times as camp relocations, house construction and general repairs.

Women in the refugee and displaced population from Burma have supported the long struggle for autonomy, carrying out traditional roles as homemakers and carers, but remaining mostly outside the main decision making bodies, including the camp committees. In the past few years, representatives from the refugee women's organisations have actively sought ways to improve women's subordinate position and work towards women's increased participation in all aspects of their society. Through education and training in human rights, income generation, capacity development and international networking, women are gradually raising awareness amongst the population that women's rights can no longer be ignored. This work is in its infancy and needs to be developed so that both women and men can work together for the benefit of their communities.

BBC is exploring ways to encourage more involvement by women through the establishment of a camp advisory group (CAG) in each camp, in addition to the regular coordination with the camp committees.

GENDER POLICY

BBC's Statement of Principles:

In developing a gender policy, BBC

- acknowledges that both women and men have the equal right to dignity and to self-determination
- recognises that the transformation of gender relations and roles is necessary to allow women and men to develop their potential and contribute fully in all aspects of their society, for the eventual benefit of their whole community
- believes that refugee men and women should cooperate in building and sustaining a fair and equitable society through equal representation, participation, opportunities and access to resources
- believes that both women and men should contribute to the empowerment of women so that women may fulfil their potential

Cultural Context:

BBC is an organisation whose staff is drawn from both Asian and Western cultures. The population of refugees supported by BBC on this border comprises different ethnic and religious groups from Burma. It is recognised by BBC that different traditional cultural norms regarding gender roles and relations enrich and diversify its work. BBC recognises the need to challenge cultural norms where they deny basic human rights for both women and men.

BBC Gender Policy:

BBC acknowledges that defining and implementing a gender policy will be an ongoing process. Its initial goal, and objectives are considered as realistic in the context of current gender awareness in BBC. BBC recognises that men and women are at different stages of gender awareness and as a result, different activities will be targeted for men and women within the refugee communities. The policy will be reviewed on a 6-monthly basis, as progress is made and aims achieved.

Goal: To increase understanding and practice of gender equality within BBC's organisation and relief programme, in partnership with refugee communities.

Objectives:

1. To provide a working environment for all staff which respects women and men as equal members
2. To increase knowledge of BBC office and field staff in gender awareness.
3. To support women's initiatives to address their needs as identified/prioritised by them.
4. To participate in initiatives by NGOs to improve gender equity in the humanitarian aid and refugee community
5. To encourage BBC staff to raise gender issues and gender awareness with men in the camp communities.

w) Environmental Impact

The impact of the refugee population on the environment was minimised until the mid-1990s by keeping the camps to the size of small villages. The refugees were not allowed to plant rice although in some areas they could forage in the jungle for roots, vegetables and building materials. The environmental impact of the camps was significant, but relatively minor when compared with the damage caused by rampant illegal logging conducted by other parties in most of the border areas. The creation of larger, consolidated camps since 1995 has placed greater strain on the environment. This has resulted in the need for BBC to supply cooking fuel, cooking stoves and building materials as explained under items f) and h). The cooking fuel is made from waste from sawmills, bamboo and coconut by-products and the building materials are usually supplied from commercially grown plots. BBC food supplies are generally delivered in reusable containers, e.g., sacks for rice, mung beans and salt, tins for fish paste and drums for cooking oil.

x) Programme Sustainability

The programme philosophy of maximising refugee input, minimising staff and aid dependency has, with the understanding of the donors, proven sustainable for nearly 19 years. The refugees have been largely responsible for their own lives and their culture has generally been maintained. Unfortunately more rigid controls on the camps introduced in recent years have now eroded the refugees' sense of self-sufficiency, making them increasingly aid-dependent. Social problems have also become more evident as the camps have become more overcrowded and restricted. Reading the BBC programme, new demands from Donors for independent control

checks have threatened to undermine the trust built up with the Refugee Committees and their own sense of responsibility and involvement in administering the assistance programme.

A major objective of the philosophy has been to ensure that the refugees can return home when the situation allows it. It can be argued that even after 19 years most of the refugees would want to go home immediately if the opportunity arose. They would be eager to just get on with their lives. However during recent years Burmese Army campaigns have destroyed hundreds of villages and created large free-fire zones. When the day comes for repatriation there will be a need for a major relief programme, not only for the returning refugees, but also for tens of thousands of internally displaced persons. There will be the need for some strategic planning for the reconstruction and redevelopment of areas laid waste by the SPDC.

Sustainability also depends on the Thai people/authorities tolerance of the refugees' presence. Although there were periods of tension in the past, in general the local population and the Thai authorities were very understanding of the refugees' needs, and tolerant of their presence. Since 1998, however, the economic crisis in Thailand has made the presence of large numbers of refugees and illegal workers a much more sensitive issue with calls for more controls and pressure to reduce numbers. A series of security 'incidents' involving armed Burmese elements, beginning with the armed raid of the Burmese Embassy in October 1999 has made matters even worse. These incidents increased the Thai authorities' concern about security and the problems refugees are perceived to be bringing to Thailand. Since then there has been increasing rhetoric against the refugees, accusing them of environmental damage, bringing in diseases, taking Thai jobs, as well as being involved in crime, prostitution and drug trafficking. In some areas the refugees are made to feel unwelcome and rumours of secret repatriation plans create anxiety in the camps. The current Thai Government policy of improving relationships and trade with its neighbouring countries is also bringing further pressure for the refugees to be repatriated.

Another factor affecting sustainability is BBC's ability to go on raising the necessary funds to cover expenditures. After a period of relatively stability during which increasing programme demands were offset by falling prices, costs are now starting to rise again with a budget increase of 22% for 2003. This will be yet another test for BBC's long serving donors particularly at a time when there is also interest in expanding humanitarian assistance inside Burma.

y) Programme Evaluation

BBC's policy includes a commitment to periodic programme evaluations as a tool for improving the effectiveness of the programme and since 1994 there have been seven as follows:

March 1994	Dutch Interchurch Aid/EC/Femconsult. Overall Programme
November 1996	Dutch Interchurch Aid/Femconsult. Monitoring Procedures
April 1997	ECHO Evaluation Report. Overall Programme
November 1997	ECHO Audit. Financial/Administration Procedures
May 1998	Dutch Interchurch Aid/International Agricultural Centre/Supplementary Feeding
April 2000	DanChurchAid/Sphere Project Minimum Standards
May 2000	UNHCR Consultant Study of BBC Cooking Fuel Supplies

The ECHO evaluations in 1997 were carried out independently by their consultants or representatives who observed BBC's activities over a short period of time. The Dutch Interchurch Aid and DanChurchAid supported evaluations though were fully participatory exercises, focussing on issues of interest/concern identified by BBC. The Dutch Interchurch Aid evaluations were progressive, each following up on previous recommendations. Effectively all of the principle recommendations of the evaluations have now been implemented and those which have not are still being actively pursued.

Two external evaluations are planned for 2003. One will be an evaluation of BBC's Management and Governance Structures scheduled for February and the other will be an evaluation of BBC's Procurement and Quality Control Procedures later in the year.

z) Visibility

The following visibility policy was adopted at the 2001 BBC Donors Meeting:

"BBC policy is not to display any publicity in the refugee camps. Its vehicles and property are unmarked and generally no Donor publicity such as stickers or signs are posted.

This policy has been observed since the beginning of the programme in 1984. The rationale is:

1. To show mutuality and promote the dignity of the refugees. The Refugee Committees are considered operational partners, sharing responsibility for providing the basic needs of the refugee communities. They are encouraged to be as self-sufficient as possible and it is not considered appropriate to make them display their dependence on outside assistance.
2. BBC has around 40 Donors. It considers that it would be inequitable to display publicity for one/some donors only and impractical to publicise all.

The BBC wishes all Donors to respect this policy. Where contractual practices necessitate publicity Donors will be requested to minimise their expectations and, if possible, to accept non-field publicity.

Whilst other NGOs working on the Thai/Burmese border do not maintain such a strict 'invisibility' policy, they nevertheless maintain a low-profile presence. This reflects the original Ministry of Interior mandate, which specified 'no publicity'."

aa) Staff Training

BBC has no systematic training programme for staff but organises period trainings and encourages staff to attend appropriate courses run by other organisations.

Trainings courses attended by staff to date include:

Year	Training	Number of Staff Attending
1993	UNHCR POP Training	1
1996	UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation	4
1997	APDC Disaster Management	1
	Humanitarian Law	1
1999	Medic First Aid	all
	DIAKONIA Statelessness	2
2000	GADWG Gender Sensitivity Training	all
	Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement	3
	Community Development	1
	Public Health in Complex Emergencies	1
2001	Powerful Presentation Skills	Field Staff
	Communication and Service Excellence	Administration Staff
	UNHCR Protection	2
	UNHCR/NGO Protection Co-ordination	2
	Protection Food, Water and Shelter	3
	Protection SGVB	2
	UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation	1
	Sphere Standards	3
	UNHCR Reach Out	2
	Nutrient Data Base Training	1
	Logistics	2
	UNHCR POP Training	2
2002	Protection Refugees Outside Camps	1
	IDP Seminar	3
	Humanitarian Principles . Why are we Here?	all
	IOM/MoL Migrant Worker Policy	1
	NCA Indigenous Knowledge	1
	SGBV UNHCR Strategic Planning	2
	Gender Workshop Bangkok Staff	all
	Gender Workshop Field Staff	all
	RedR Training	3
	NGO/UNHCR Protection Workshop	2
	4WD Training	6
	eCentre UNHCR Japan	1
2003	Dietary Assessment	1
	Rice Testing	1

APPENDIX E

BBC PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Figure 3.3 in Section 3 sets out BBC's revised Logframe showing the Performance Indicators adopted and the proposed Means of Verification. BBC began to develop Performance Indicators at the end of 2000 and initially prioritised those relating to food distribution. These have been presented in 6-month reports from 2001. The revised Logframe includes indicators for the provision of shelter and relief items, coordination of services, and assistance to Thai communities and during 2003 indicators for gender and refugee participation will be developed. Indicators available for the second half of 2002 are as follows:

Aim: To alleviate malnutrition and food security and meet the physical needs for survival of women, men and children, in partnership with their community.

Indicator (A)1: Percentage of children <5 with wasting malnutrition:

Means of Verification

- BBC Supplementary Feeding Statistics: children <5 enrolled in supplementary feeding programmes.
- Nutrition Survey: children <5 weight/height measurements (WHO/NCHS %median).
- Common Data Collection: children identified as malnourished (will be implemented during 2003).

BBC has, since mid-1999, presented statistics on the number of malnourished children receiving supplementary feeding from the medical NGOs at their clinics. Statistics for the second half of 2002 are as follows:

Figure F.1: Number of Children < 5 Enrolled in Supplementary Feeding Programmes: Jul-Dec 2002

Camp(s)	NGO	Jul-02		Aug-02		Sep-02		Oct-02		Nov-02		Dec-02		6 Month Average		% of Pop. ³ < 5 years	
		Mod ¹	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev	Mod	Sev
Camps 2, 3 & 5	IRC	37	0	43	0	57	0	62	0	52	0	45	0	49	0	1.80%	0.00%
Mae Kong Kha	MHD	12	0	12	0	18	0	18	0	12	0	9	0	13	0	0.62%	0.00%
Mae Ra Ma Luang	AMI/MHD	29	0	53	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	41	0	2.86%	0.00%
Mae La	MSF	13	2	16	2	15	6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	15	3	0.27%	0.06%
Umpiem Mai	ARC	3	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	4	0	3	0	0.12%	0.00%
Nu Po	ARC	32	0	29	0	22	0	20	0	16	0	15	0	22	0	1.48%	0.00%
Don Yang	ARC	16	0	15	0	16	0	20	0	23	0	23	0	19	0	3.80%	0.00%
Halochangee/IDC	MSF	24	1	17	0	26	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	22	0	4.04%	0.06%
Tham Hin	MSF	31	0	37	0	31	0	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	33	0	2.68%	0.00%
Total		197	3	225	2	184	6	121	0	108	0	96	0	217	3	1.21%	0.02%
Total Global Malnutrition²		200		227		190		121		108		96		220		1.24%⁴	

1. Mod = moderate malnutrition (<80% median W/H); Sev = severe malnutrition (<70% median W/H, WHO/NCHS Reference Standards) Figures based on average monthly caseload reported by NGOs on statistics reports to BBC.

2. Total Global Malnutrition prevalence = severe + moderate.

3. Population figures from medical agencies via CCSDPT Common Data form.

4. WHO states that malnutrition <5% is 'acceptable,' 5-9% poor, etc. Thailand's malnutrition rate in 1993 = 5.9%.

The number of malnourished patients enrolled in the supplementary feeding programmes remains very small, representing only 1.24% of the under-5 population in the camps. This compares with average global malnutrition rates of 0.83%, 1.24%, 0.57%, and 0.75% in the previous four six-month periods respectively.

These numbers should accurately represent the prevalence of malnutrition in children in the majority of camps, assuming that children are identified and treated. However, the recent nutrition surveys indicate that the actual rate may be either slightly higher or lower than supplementary feeding figures. For example, *using the same criteria as is used in the camps (%median wt/ht)*, the surveys showed the following rates: Karenni Camp 2: 0.7%; Don Yang: 1.3% Umpiem Mai: 2.6%; Tham Hin: 1.5%. The differences may be due to slight variations in age of children who are enrolled (e.g., different age recording systems can mean <5 is 4.9 to 5.9 years), in entrance weight and height criteria, or in program coverage. Camps that have higher rates of malnutrition may have more illness, poorer feeding practices of small children, or a more transient population that needs to share ration food more often.

The medical agencies have agreed to conduct 6-monthly nutrition surveys to begin in 2003 to ensure accurate measurement of malnutrition in the camps.

Indicator (A) 2: Percentage of children <5 with signs of xerophthalmia (Vitamin A deficiency)

Means of Verification

- Nutrition Survey: clinical examinations for vitamin A deficiency.
- Medical Agency Data: screening and clinical incidence of vitamin A deficiency.

No surveys were conducted during the reporting period. The medical agencies routinely provide Vitamin A supplements to children <5 because they are most at risk for deficiency (which can cause permanent blindness and illness). BBC will assume responsibility for coordinating vitamin A procurement (via donation from UNICEF), distribution to medical agencies, and monitoring during 2003.

Due to the low rates of vitamin A deficiency, and in accordance with UNICEF requirements for reporting, the indicators for vitamin A will be revised to reflect supplement coverage (% target population that receives vitamin A supplements), rather than incidence of deficiency.

Indicator (A) 3: Percentage of population diagnosed with clinically apparent thiamine (vitamin B₁) deficiency

Means of Verification

- Common Data Collection: clinical incidence of thiamine deficiency.

Data collected from all camps for July through December 2002 show the following case rates of vitamin B₁ deficiency:

Figure F.2: Vitamin B1 Deficiency, July to December 2002

Age Group	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
< 5 Years	0.8	2.8	3.3	3.3	2.9	2.8
> 5 Years	5.1	5.8	7.0	8.5	8.3	4.2
All Ages	4.4	5.3	6.4	7.7	7.4	3.9
All Ages Jan-Jun 02	5.7	5.6	5.1	4.7	4.5	3.7

Rate = Cases/1000 persons.

Data from CCSDPT Common Data for 2002.

According to the Sphere Project, the nutritional needs of the population are met when 'there are no cases of beriberi' (vitamin B₁ deficiency). The CCSDPT has revised the guidelines for diagnosing vitamin B₁ deficiency to reflect the true incidence more accurately, and thus rates are lower than the last six-month period for most camps. Because of the diet based on polished rice and other factors that inhibit vitamin B₁, some cases of deficiency will be expected. 'Acceptable rates' will be determined following final revision of guidelines and re-training of medics in camps.

Indicator (A) 4: Mortality Rates

- Crude Mortality Rate: per 1000 population (CMR)
- < 5 Mortality Rate: per 1000 U-5 population (U-5MR)

Means of Verification

Common Data Collection: Mortality rates

Figure F.3: Crude Mortality Rates in all Camps 2000 to 2002

All Camps	2000	2001	2002	Thailand 1998
CMR per 1,000 population	4.9	4.6	4.4	5.2
Under 5 MR per 1,000	9.2	9.1	6.9	2.8

Objective 1: To ensure that displaced persons will receive adequate availability and access to food to sustain life.

Indicator (B) 1.1: Ration provides average 2,100 kcals/person/day

Means of Verification

- Nutritional analysis of ration.

The nutritional content of BBC's basic food basket standard ration is calculated at approximately 2,230 kcals/person/day border-wide. This meets the WFP/UNHCR recommendation of a minimum of 2,100 kcals/person/day. Calculations are based on data from the Institute of Nutrition at Mahidol University, ASEAN Food Composition Tables (2000). The actual ration may vary slightly between camps, but all variations meet the minimum recommendation.

Indicator (B) 1.2: Percentage of commodities meeting the quality specifications agreed upon by BBC and the suppliers.

Means of Verification

- Reports of Independent Inspectors.
- Acceptance by camp committee.

For the second half of 2002 independent inspectors carried out inspections of deliveries of rice, beans, cooking oil and charcoal for each purchase-contract border-wide. The results are as follows.

Figure F.4: Results of Quality Control Inspections, July to December 2002

Commodity	Quantity Checked (1,4)	% of all purchases in period (2)	% Checked (3)	Quantity Check		Quality Check	
				Amount verified (4)	% Short	Amount Sub-standard (5)	% Sub-standard
Rice (MT)	5,327	54	10	5,316	0.22	486 (6)	9.14
Mung Beans (MT)	165	22	10	165	0.01	-	0.00
Cooking Oil (ltr)	179,013	32	10	180,180	-0.65	-	0.00
Charcoal (MT)	1,030	23	4	1,033	-0.29	340 (6)	32.88

1. This table summarises the results of checks made by independent inspectors on these shipments during the period.
2. The shipments checked were between 22 and 54% of all purchases of these items during the period. Sample target was 50% of all deliveries to Mae La and once per contract (usually six months) for all other camps.
3. One in 10 (10%) sacks/drums of rice, beans and oil, and one in 25 (4%) sacks of charcoal were tested for each shipment.
4. Quantity Checked is the amount contracted with the supplier or factory. Amount verified is the amount determined by the Inspector.
5. Amount Sub-Standard is amount rejected by Inspector for not meeting quality/packaging contract standard.
6. One shipment of rice was lower grade than 35% ordered and two contractors supplied charcoal with high ash content resulting in heating value up to 10% lower than contract specification.

The Independent checks confirmed that the suppliers were sending supplies very close in weight/volume to contract. During this period there were some problems with some shipments of rice and charcoal as per 6 above.

The independent inspectors check a sample of supplies, but the refugees then check every sack/container at the time of receipt/distribution. Suppliers are generally either penalised, replaced defective items, or send in additional supplies to make up for losses.

Rice sacks rejected by the committees during distribution are now recorded as part of the regular monitoring reports as shown in s) Appendix D. This system was still not fully functional during this period recording only 54 sacks of rice rejected by the committees and replaced by the suppliers. More complete records will be available in 2003.

Indicator (B) 1.3: Percentage of distribution points that are readily accessible to all recognised population recorded by camp committee and at convenient times

Means of Verification

- Go-down locations. Number of refugees per distribution point.
- Go-down locations. Furthest walking distance from distribution point.
- Camp Committee distribution schedules

The average number of refugees served by each distribution centre is 3,170, with a maximum of 10,485 in Mae La and a minimum of 1,098 in Mae Ra Ma Luang. (Sphere Project minimum standard is 20,000:1).

All **camp distribution points** are within **one kilometre** walking distance of the population. This compares with the UNHCR minimum standard of **five kms**.

Refugees are informed of distribution times in advance. Distribution is carried out all day by section but supplies may be collected after the allocated distribution time.

Indicator (C) 1.1: Percentage of recognised population that received the rations planned

Means of Verification

- Up-to-date population figures, registered and new arrivals
- Stock and distribution records
- Monitor ration books
- Checks on rations received after distribution
- Household checks

The BBC receives **updated population figures** from the camp committees every month including adjustments for new arrivals, births and deaths. These are cross-correlated against UNHCR registration figures and, where available, MOI camp commander statistics. These are considered an accurate record on which to base camp supplies.

Stock and distribution records were upgraded and standardised and introduced to all camps during the first half of 2002. Summary statistics confirming the distribution of supplies for the second half of the year are shown in m) Appendix D. This information compares the amount of stock distributed with the overall calculated need of the population to give the "efficiency in the distribution system". The average distribution efficiency rate was satisfactory at 98.5% (within + or – 5%) with only one camp outside the acceptable range. This is first time this statistic has been produced and variations will be investigated during the next period.

The accuracy of **ration books** are being checked as part of the regular staff monitoring checks (see Appendix D). Sample rates have yet to be fully determined by BBC, as staff are still assessing acceptable monitoring levels. During the last 6 month period 369 ration books were checked and all found to be accurate (100%). In November 2002, after consultation with the refugee committees, BBC printed and distributed standard ration books to all Karen camps along the border. This process will likely be extended to Karenni camps in the north during the later half of this year. In some camps the section leaders keep the ration books, but with the distribution of new ration books the aim is for all households to keep their own books.

Random **checks on the weight** of rice and beans received after the distribution points are now also being regularly carried out (see Appendix D). During the last 6-month period BBC carried out 18 'Control Checks' on a total of 360 families spread among the camps. Checks showed that on average they received 97% of their intended ration, with 98% receiving within plus or minus 10% of the calculated ration. Variations both above and below the ration are followed up and in most cases the reasons are acceptable such as family members being out of the camp at the time of distribution.

The staff also check a random **sample of households** each month to confirm that all supplies have been received. 560 household checks were made during this period and 554 (99%) were judged to have received their full ration entitlements.

Indicator (C) 2.1 : Existence of supplementary feeding programmes

Means of verification

Common data collection

Indicator (C) 2.2 : Reimbursement of all food for supplementary feeding programmes

Means of verification

Monthly SF reimbursement claims from medical agencies totalled baht 5,128,998 for the period July-Dec 2002.

Objective 2. To ensure displaced persons will receive adequate shelter, cooking fuel and basic relief items

Indicator (B) 2.1 : Bamboo and thatch provide sufficient covered space per person

Means of verification – not available

Materials provided can build minimum:

- i. Standard house (1-5 people)
- ii. Large house (6 + people)

Indicator (B) 2.2 : Cooking fuel provided meets minimum energy requirement.

Means of verification

Not available (BBC estimates currently around 25% deficiency. See Section 3))

Random samples and Laboratory testing to confirm MJoules/kg of fuel provided.

Indicator (B) 2.3 : Sufficient blankets, bednets and mats

Means of verification –

Household checks for the above items are informal to ensure

- 1 Blanket/person
- 1 Family size Bednet/3 people
- 1 Sleeping Mat/3 people

Objective 3: To ensure population (men and women) will participate in design and implementation of programme

Indicators and means of verification concerning gender and refugee participation will be developed this year

Indicator (B) 3.1: Women and men are consulted and involved in decision making re: needs assessment, programme design and implementation

Indicator (B) 3.2.: Representative Consumer Advisory groups (CAG) in all camps.

Objective 4: To co-ordinate all activities with other service providers

Indicator (B) 4: Membership and participation in CCSDPT, Protection Working group, Provincial coordination meetings

Means of verification

At least one staff member attends CCSDPT monthly Executive Committee, Open, Work and Health Subcommittee meetings, Provincial Coordination meetings (NGO/Refugee Community/UNHCR and NGO/Refugee Community/UNHCR/RTG), NGO/IO/UNHCR meetings. BBC currently holds Chair of CCSDPT and Cochair of Health Subcommittee and is an active member of Protection Working Group

Objective 5: To minimise any adverse effects which the presence of refugees might have on Thai Communities

Indicator (B) 5 : Respond to requests for assistance in coordination with RTG

Means of verification

21 requests to a value of baht 3,176,119 were supported from July to December 2002 (including support for local Thai authorities)

Inputs 1: tendering, payment, logistics, human resources

- Funding receipts/expectations.
- Tendering: % of purchases tendered.
- Tendering: Average number of bids.
- Delivery: Delivery slips vs purchase orders.

The continuity of the BBC programme and the timely delivery of supplies to the refugees depends on BBC receiving adequate funds in a timely fashion. Donor policy is for BBC to have adequate cash to cover expenditures one month ahead of the current one (i.e., a one-month reserve). In the past this has rarely happened and in many cases funds only arrive during the month in which expenditures are being made. Figure F.5 shows the percentage of funds available at the beginning of each month for that month's expenditures, for each of the last five years. The first half of 2002 was extremely tight without a single month where BBC had had a full one month reserve (>200% of current month expenditures). For four months there were not even enough funds available at the beginning of the month for that month's expenditures (< 100%). As usual, the situation was much better during the second half of the year. The challenge remains how to improve cash flow during the difficult early months of the year when many Donors are still processing grants.

Figure F.5: BBC Cash Flow

Cash Available at Beginning of Month as Percentage of Funding Required for Expenditures (target 200%)					
	1998 (%)	1999 (%)	2000 (%)	2001 (%)	2002 (%)
January	110	44	112	3	91
February	25	147	84	88	183
March	82	139	121	25	73
April	25	125	44	66	108
May	133	86	7	66	11
June	210	36	20	5	75
July	136	163	77	64	20
August	175	96	99	116	268
September	281	256	132	313	391
October	93	279	76	448	194
November	45	175	199	167	117
December	23	72	72	172	67
Yearly Average	112	135	87	128	133
Months < 100%	6	5	8	7	6
Months > 200%	2	2	0	2	2

To maximise the cost effectiveness of the programme, BBC aims to get competitive pricing for all major supply items. During the second half of 2002 competitive tendering was undertaken for all purchases of rice, beans, cooking oil, charcoal, and bednets, or 90% of all commodity expenditures. A higher proportion items are purchased through competitive tendering in the second half of the year because non-tendered items are mainly purchased in the first half of the year, particularly fish paste and building materials.

The introduction of formal tendering during the last few years has been very effective but its ongoing effectiveness will depend on BBC being able to maintain the ongoing interest of potential suppliers and receiving adequate competitive bids. The average number of bids received in the second half of 2002 was rice 3 (4), beans 3 (3), cooking oil 3 (3), charcoal 4 (4), blankets 6 (6), bednets 7(-), and sleeping mats 7 (-). (Figures in brackets are for last 6-month period) Competition remained keen for this period but slightly fewer bids were received for rice.

The efficiency of BBC's procurement procedures can also be measured by checking whether quantities received in camp were in accordance with purchase orders. The camp committees check deliveries and sign delivery slips for each consignment. BBC staff then check these against the purchase orders before payment.

Inputs 2: Distribution of goods by camp committees

- Staff monitoring reports.
- Camp records.

The results of the regular staff monitoring visits are set out in r) Appendix D. The staff made 216 camp visits during the second half of 2002 an average of over 3.6 visits to each camp per month. They carried out 285 checks on seven different aspects of the camp supply and distribution system, including the camp records, and of these only 13 checks required some kind of follow-up or noted special attention.

Appendix F: Table F1

Appendix F: Table F2

Appendix F: Table F3

Appendix F: Table F4

Appendix F: Table F5, F6

APPENDIX G

BBC MEETING SCHEDULE 2003

1. BBC Board Meetings

Tuesday 1.30pm, BBC Office, Bangkok:

January	14	July	8
February	11	August	5
March	11	September	9
April	8	October	7
May	13	November	11
June	10	December	16

In accordance with the BBC Structure and Regulations agreed by the Donors Meeting, all Donors have the right to attend Board Meetings as observers.

2. CCSDPT Meetings

The CCSDPT information and coordination Meetings take place every month at the British Club, Soi 18 Silom Road, on the **Wednesday** immediately after the Board Meeting. The schedule is:

January	15	July	9
February	12	August	6
March	12	September	10
April	9	October	8
May	14	November	12
June	11	December	17

0900 – 1100	CCSDPT Open Session (NGOs, IOs, Embassies)
1100 – 1200	CCSDPT Work Session (NGOs only)
1330 – 1530	CCSDPT Health and Education Subcommittees

3. BBC Advisory Committee Meeting/Border Visit

19 – 23 May

4. BBC Donors Meeting

October, Brussels, Belgium. (To be confirmed)