Working with refugees since 1984
About The Border Consortium (TBC)
TBC envisions a peaceful Burma/Myanmar where there is full respect for human rights, diversity is embraced, and communities can prosper.
Who We Are
Founded in 1984, the Border Consortium (TBC) is unique among humanitarian organisations in Southeast Asia. We are the only International Non-Government Organisation specifically established to assist in managing the refugee influx from Myanmar and to provide emergency support to displaced communities along the Thai Myanmar border.
TBC is based in Bangkok and operates under United Kingdom charitable governance standards. Our Board and senior leadership team represent a mix of local and international expertise. This structure ensures accountability to consortium members, donors, and the communities it serves, while enabling it to draw on both regional knowledge and international networks.
Over the years the organisation has changed and evolved. Today the consortium’s members consist of nine international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) from ten countries. They are:
Act for Peace, The National Council for Churches (NCCA), Australia
Christian Aid, UK and Ireland , Church World Service, USA
DanChurchAid, Denmark
Diakonia, Sweden
ICCO Cooperation, The Netherlands
Inter Pares, Canada
International Rescue Committee, USA
Norwegian Church Aid, Norway
TBC’s head office is in Bangkok, Thailand. The organisation has field offices in Mae Hong Son, Mae Sot, and Kanchanaburi towns in Thailand.
TBC Board
TBC board members meet at least twice annually in person at an Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) and at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). At least another two meetings are conducted over the Internet each year. Board members are elected for a two-year term at the AGM. The board has a minimum of five members and a maximum of eight. The board must consist of at least four member-agency representatives. Up to four external candidates can be elected.
TBC currently has a staff of 56 people The total staff gender ratio is almost exactly 50:50. The majority of staff are local employees. Staff backgrounds reflect in many ways the populations with whom TBC works, with many our employees having full or part Karen/Kayin, Karenni/Kayah, Burman, Shan, Thai, and other backgrounds.
Donors
Approximately 95 percent of its funding came from government donors such as US, UK & Australia. Although most of TBC’s funds are now institutional, it still continues to receive funds from individuals, private foundations and organisations and churches. These contributions are particularly encouraging and uplifting for our staff and members. To make a donation, please visit the Donation page.
TBC would like to sincerely thank its donors and members for their generous contributions and support.
Our Vision
People displaced from Southeastern Myanmar, refugees in Thailand, and the communities where they live are rebuilding their lives – free to move safely, work, study, and plan their futures with dignity.
TBC’s Vision articulates a clear direction for its work, grounded in principles of protection, dignity, and self-reliance. It reflects TBC’s long-term commitment to supporting displaced communities from Southeastern Myanmar, refugees in Thailand, and the communities where they reside, as they work to rebuild their lives and plan their futures.
This Vision serves as the cornerstone of TBC’s Strategic Plan, providing a strategic foundation for decision-making, ensuring that priorities align with the aspirations of the people served and the partners TBC works alongside. It is a statement of intent and accountability, reflecting both the challenges faced by these communities and the opportunities for transformation. Through collaboration with local communities, governments, and regional partners, TBC is committed to advancing a future of safety, resilience, and dignity for all.
Our Values
- Refugee and Displaced Person Centred: We place the needs, perspectives, and aspirations of displaced people and host communities at the centre of all decisions, programs, and partnerships, ensuring our work is responsive, inclusive, and empowering.
- Integrity and Ethics: We uphold the highest standards of honesty, fairness, and transparency in all our actions, ensuring trust and accountability with the communities and partners we serve.
- Respect and Empathy: We treat every individual with dignity, seeking to understand their experiences and needs, and responding with compassion and care.
- Collaboration and Teamwork: We believe in the power of partnerships and collective effort, working across teams, organisations, and communities to achieve shared goals.
- Inclusion and Diversity: We value diverse perspectives and experiences, actively promoting equality and creating spaces where everyone is represented and empowered.
- Commitment and Work Ethic: We demonstrate dedication, professionalism, and resilience in delivering meaningful and sustainable outcomes for displaced communities.
Our values form the foundation of TBC’s identity, shaping the way the organisation works with
communities, partners, and each other. Central to TBC’s work is a strong commitment to being refugee
and displaced community centred, ensuring that those served are at the heart of every decision and
initiative. By prioritising their voices and experiences, TBC facilitates programs and partnerships that
are not only responsive but also empowering. Our values of integrity, respect, collaboration, inclusion,
and commitment build on this foundation, fostering dignity, fairness, and trust throughout operations.
Strategic Direction 1: Humanitarian and Emergency Response
Communities affected by conflict and displacement can access timely life- saving food, shelter, and protection, with no one left behind.
TBC’s humanitarian response prioritises timely, life-saving assistance for communities affected by conflict and displacement in Southeast Myanmar and Thailand. This includes essential support such as food, cooking fuel, shelter, essential non-food items, and protection tailored to the emergency dynamics, with a clear focus on local leadership and refugee-led delivery systems. Humanitarian action is grounded in TBC’s trusted networks of refugee committees, ethnic leadership, and local civil society, ensuring that interventions are culturally relevant, community-driven, and accountable. Refugees and displaced persons are not only recipients of emergency humanitarian assistance but are empowered as leaders, decision-makers, and first responders. TBC acts as a facilitator, providing technical support, funding, and advocacy to ensure communities have the resources, skills, and authority to respond effectively. This approach strengthens resilience and reinforces community trust while ensuring assistance is tailored to local realities.
Strategic Direction 2: Local Integration, Resilience, and Recovery
Displaced people and host communities can rebuild their lives with safety, dignity, and equal opportunity.
Displaced people, refugees, and host communities in Southeast Myanmar and Thailand can strengthen their ability to cope, adapt, and rebuild their lives. Women, people with disabilities, and minorities are supported to claim their rights, reduce exposure to harm, and pursue safe and fair opportunities for work, health, and education. TBC enables communities to take steps towards durable solutions and advocates with others to address the protection gaps where legal frameworks are absent.
Strategic Direction 3: Strengthen Local Leadership and Governance
Communities lead their own decisions, resources, and services in inclusive and accountable ways.
Communities affected by displacement and conflict in Southeast Myanmar and Thailand can take the lead in making decisions, managing resources, and organising local services. Women, people with disabilities, and minorities are supported to have an equal voice in leadership and governance. TBC plays a facilitative role, enabling and connecting communities with partners, so that local leadership is inclusive, accountable, and sustainable.
Strategic Direction 4: Maintain TBC Organisational Capacity and Flexibility
TBC stays strong, adaptable, and ready to support communities through changing times.
TBC remains a trusted and effective partner by keeping the right people, systems, and resources in place to support communities in Southeast Myanmar and Thailand. TBC’s role as facilitator, enabler, connector, and advocate adapts to match the changing operating environment. This flexibility allows TBC to expand or reduce engagement as resources and needs shift, while maintaining a strong
commitment to inclusion and localisation.
Establishing the Camps, Establishing the Consortium
The year 1984 is the starting point for the establishment of what was supposed to be temporary refugee camps in Thailand for ethnic Karen fleeing offensives by Burmese troops. It wasn’t the first time that people fled over the Moei River that separates the two neighbouring countries to seek temporary sanctuary in Thailand. In fact, for several years, refugees would cross the border near Mae Sariang during the annual dry season offensive by the Burmese army around the Karen National Union headquarters near Manerplaw. Local Thai-Karen communities and missionary groups would provide temporary relief in this remote part of Thailand and the situation received little public attention. When the rains came, those who fled would return home to plough and plant their crops.
But 1984 changed all that.
The military offensive in 1984 on the trading posts of the KNU along the Moei River opposite Tak province was more widespread, intense and sustained, and subsequently, the 9,000 Karen who fled was too much for local communities in Thailand to deal with. It was at this point that the Thai government, through the Ministry of Interior, requested voluntary agencies to provide emergency assistance. These voluntary agencies had been working in Thailand for several years already, dealing with the Indochinese refugees through the umbrella of the Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT).
The seven agencies who decided to provide support to the Karen refugees pooled their financial resources and established a joint programme. Together, these agencies formed the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA), the original name of what is now The Border Consortium.
At the beginning, TBC’s work was rather more simple than it is today. Principally, the consortium funded the provision of emergency relief in the form of rice, fishpaste, salt and chilli which was supplied to the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC). The KRC in turn would distribute the food and relief supplies to the refugees.
From the outset, TBC found the KRC to be highly organised, establishing the camps themselves. All camp activities such as cultural and educational needs were sustained by the refugees themselves. Furthermore, TBC did not provide all the refugees essential food needs, as a level of self-sufficiency existed, particularly in the early years.
Other essential relief items such as blankets, mosquito nets and cooking utensils were also provided. There were initially seven camps along the River Moei, with refugees building their homes out of bamboo and dried leaves foraged in the nearby forest. This ‘temporary’ situation remained, and over the years, as more sustained military offensives continued, more refugees started arriving.
1988
Events in 1988 in central Burma brought the world’s attention to the democracy
struggle. Spurred on by economic mismanagement and violent suppression
of student demonstrations, a national uprising comprising of all sectors of
society manifest in mass street demonstrations, a general strike, and calls
for democracy. A violent crackdown, with thousands of protestors gunned
down in the streets bloodily ensured that the overthrow of military rule
was not going to happen. Students fled to the border areas, and ethnic
Karen, Mon, and Karenni communities provided support to them. Some
students made their way over the border to the camps, while some formed
an armed group with support from the KNU. The students brought new
cooperation and relations between ethnic groups and the ethnic Burman
and also international attention to the Burmese situation.
The Burma military meanwhile, staged a coup in September 1988,
replacing the previous military-led government – the Burma Socialist
Programme Party – with a new ruling clique, the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC). A subsequent national election was held in
1990 and despite SLROC intimidation of democratic forces, including the
imprisonment of emergent democracy leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and
previous Prime Minister, U Nu, the military lost heavily. Their party won
ust ten seats while Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy
(NLD) party won an overwhelming majority, 80% of the seats. Unwilling to
accept defeat, SLORC reneged on its promise to respect the outcome of
the election, arrested at least 100 elected representatives, declared the
necessity of drafting a new constitution before a transfer of power, and in
1992 established the National Convention for this purpose. This set the
country into stasis politically for much of the next twenty years. General
Than Shwe became the junta head in 1992, and SLORC changed its name in
1997 to the State Peace and Development Council. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
Nobel Peace Prize Winner in 1991, remained under house arrest for much
of this time, and the military’s political position appeared set. This moment
of hope in 1988 then, not just for the democracy protesters in Rangoon
but also for ethnic nationalities such as the Karen and the Mon, was
extinguished, and military rule was consolidated over the next few years via
persecution of democracy actors, military offensives against ethnic groups,
and the closing of meaningful space for political reform.
Fall of Manerplaw: More offensives, more refugees
Beginning in 1995, however, a major development regarding armed conflict
had huge, permanent impacts on displacement and refugee communities.
A section of rank-and-file soldiers from the KNU, unhappy at perceived
Christian dominance of KNU leadership, broke away to form the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). A SLORC offensive against KNU’s headquarters
at Manerplaw, aided by this DKBA splinter group who knew the territory
well, resulted in the KNU’s loss of this politically and symbolically important
place in early 1995. It was important not just for the KNU as its show-piece
headquarters, but for the various pro-democracy forces and other organisations
also based there. After the fall, SLORC forces continued their military
operations north and south of Manerplaw, taking control of territory on
the Moei and Salween Rivers. This led to a wave of refugees seeking safety
over the border in Thailand, and TBC reported its biggest population
increase in a six month period – up to 91,000 from 77,000.
The 1995 offensive against Manerplaw was a huge military victory for the
SLORC, after which they controlled the border area from Mae Sot up to
Mae Sariang. They did not stop there though, and 1995 started a period of
the fall of what was then a ‘bufferzone’ on the border. A short-lived ceasefire
in 1995 with the Karenni National Progressive Party broke down and a new
offensive, including the use of airstrikes, was enough for SLORC to effectively
take control of the Karenni border by April 1996. More offensives against the
KNU in the years following the fall of Manerplaw, as well as the surrender
of Khun Sa in Shan State meant that by 1997, the ethnic ‘bufferzone’ along the
border with Thailand has fallen and the SLORC/SPDC controlled most of this
area.
Camp Consolidation
One of the most important implications of this emergency situation was
the beginning of a plan by the Thai government to consolidate the various
smaller camps into a few larger camps, the reasoning being that larger
camps are easier to defend given the real threat of attack from over the
border. While this was an understandable response, there was concern
that this would replace the village-style settlements that promoted self-
sufficiency among the refugee populations since the beginning of the
camps in 1984. Larger, more ‘town-style’ camps would impact the relief
programme, making the refugees more aid-dependent. TBC managed to
negotiate a compromise whereby camp consolidation would happen, but
this wouldn’t be to the extent originally mooted. However attacks on the
refugee camps continued until 1998 as DKBA troops would enter camps,
murdering and robbing refugees and threatening them with more violence.
In the first six months of 1996 alone, the Thai army reported 44 DKBA
incursions, resulting in 14 deaths. In 1997, with another huge increase
in refugees, bringing the population in the camps up to 116,000 due to
a renewed offensive by SLORC, the DKBA attacked three refugee camps,
destroying Wangka and Don Pa Kiang camps before being repelled from
Mae La camp. This left 7,000 refugees homeless and catalysed a more
security-focussed strategy towards refugee camps from Thai authorities.
Subsequently, the fencing in of the camps, stricter controls of movement in
and out and more stringent restrictions on what activities were permitted in
camps were enacted by Thai security forces.
The camp consolidation process, which was catalysed by these attack starting
in 1995, continued apace, with seven camps closed in the first 6 months of
1998. Sometimes these camp consolidations were undertaken haphazardly
without proper planning and sometimes with force. By 1998, the NGOs that
were part of TBC were able to negotiate the details with local authorities,
organising transportation with the Thai army for 9,000 refugees, and
purchasing construction materials for housing and public buildings at the
new sites for a total of 15,000 refugees. By the end of 1998, TBC was
providing assistance in 17 locations, four of which were across the border,
compared with 30 at the beginning of 1995. The consolidations were not
100% welcomed, and a protest against being moved from Mae Ye Hta Camp
to the new Mae Ra Ma Luang Camp occurred in February 1998, with camp
residents refusing to move due to security concerns at the new camp.
Restraint, patience, and negotiation between the refugee leaders, the
Refugee Committee, the Thai army and other Thai authorities, however,
meant that the situation was resolved peacefully.
The new security-based restrictions, including not permitting refugees to go
outside to find work, forage, or cut down bamboo or wood resulted in TBC
having to provide all of the building materials for some camps, extend the
distribution of yellow beans and soya bean oil as food supplements in order
to maintain basic nutritional needs, and supply sawdust logs for cooking
fuel in many places. This meant that the refugees became more aid dependent.
Apart from this growing aid dependency, the more stringent camp conditions
reduced quality of life for refugees, deterred potential newcomers, and
resulted in some leaving to try their luck as part of the huge migrant
workforce that lives in Thailand, many of whom are undocumented and share
similar experiences in their homeland and characteristics of those refugees
living in the camps.
TBC also supported other displacement sites over the border, primarily
through food such as rice, including Karen camps along the Moei River, and
to around 6,000 displaced persons in IDP sites in Shan State. Working with
the Shan Refugee Committee, additional support has also been provided to
a displacement site in Wang Hieng Province, northern Thailand, which has
been home to several hundred refugees, although they are not recognised
as such by the Thai government.
Internal Displacement and Relocations
As SLORC (later SPDC) forces gained territorial control of southeastern Burma,
the causes of displacement began to evolve. While direct armed conflict
continued to displace villagers, with SLORC troops establishing a permanent
presence in many areas of the southeast, human rights violations related to
forced labour, forced relocations, extortion, the torching of villages,
destruction of food stores and crops, theft of livestock and property, extra-
judicial killings, and rape, were all every day occurrences affecting hundreds
of thousands of people. The forced relocations of whole villages to areas
more directly under military control which began in 1996 created massive
upheaval and was one of the main contributing factors to a sharp increase in
internal displacement. At relocation sites, villagers reported a lack of access
to food, safe drinking water, services, agricultural land, and faced demands
for forced labour and other abuses. This occurred throughout the southeast,
from Tenasserim through Mon, Karen and up to Karenni and Shan States.
Since 2002, in partnership with ethnic community-based organisations, TBC has
been documenting, researching and analysing these trends, producing annual
reports on internal displacement. According to TBC and partners’ research,
by 2006, at least 3,000 ethnic villages had been destroyed since 1996,
affecting over one million people. Probably more than 300,000 had fled to
Thailand as refugees (the majority being Shan and not recognised as
refugees by the Thai government). TBC estimated in 2006 that there were
still around 500,000 IDPs in the border areas of Burma, including at least
95,000 in free-fire areas, 287,000 in cease-fire areas (including 11,000 in
Mon resettlement sites) and 118,000 in relocation sites. The 2006 population
in the camps in Thailand meanwhile, had reached 154,000. Many of the
new arrivals in the camps were previously internally displaced people inside
Burma.
Evolution of TBC’s Programme
With the increases in refugee population and the changes of how the
camps were set up, TBC also began to evolve. In 1996, at the time when
TBC moved away from its informal model to a more institutionalised
structure, there were just seven staff. By 2000 this had increased to 19
and by 2006 there were 50. There needed to be more field staff to liaise
with Thai authorities, given the new restrictions placed on the camps.
Furthermore, with the refugees becoming more aid dependent, more
supplies were needed to be delivered to the refugees. In fact, at the
beginning, in 1984, the original aim of what was then called CCA was to
cover most but not all of the staple diet needs with the responsibility to
bridge the gap covered by the refugees themselves, ensuring a level of
self-reliance. However, as the camps became more tightly controlled by
Thai authorities, including not being able to leave the camps to find work or
forage, by the mid-1990s, TBC was providing 100% of the food needs. And
with more food needs meant more administrative costs and staffing. Added
to this is that donors began requiring more ‘professionalised’ standards of
transparency and accountability. This included responding to requirements
for indicators to measure programme performance, international standards
of competitive bidding and independent monitoring of the quality and
distribution of supplies. Of course, the standards that the donors require are about increasing efficiency, accountability and effectiveness of the programme, but a
challenge was to accommodate these without impacting the unique
relationship between the programme and the refugee communities
who were substantively involved in running their own lives and sharing
responsibility for the programme. One concrete example of this is that
ECHO, the EU’s humanitarian aid body, and previously a major donor of
TBC, required particular quality control tests for the relief provision. In the
past, TBC relied on the Refugee Committees to check the weights and quality
of provision, familiar with the provisions as they had been for many years.
The worry was that introducing an external professional inspection company
would be a sign of distrust towards the refugee communities. This type
of problem has been a long-term balancing act for TBC, of maintaining
the partnership with refugees whilst satisfying the donors requirements.
Throughout its existence, TBC has worked particularly hard to ensure that it
maintained its original philosophy of ensuring refugees’ agency and that they
are responsible for running their own affairs by involving the refugee committees
in developing these new procedures. It does remain, however, an ongoing
challenge.
As well as increased food needs, TBC began to expand its programme in a
whole host of ways. Nutrition surveys, clothing delivery, agriculture projects,
education, sanitation, income generation projects, gender empowerment,
protection and good governance are just a few. On top of such activities,
the bureaucratic and administrative needs grew hugely, and tendering,
monitoring, procurement, financial controls and auditing all became
essential components of TBC’s work. External evaluations became a regular
occurrence, whether on specific needs such as adequate nutrition provisions
in the food baskets for refugees or for overall programme implementation.
TBC also supported various other community needs along the border
including a safe house in Sangkhlaburi, support to Thai communities, for
example during episodes of flooding, or during the 1997 financial crisis.
Thankfully, donors continued to support the programme, and new donors
were found. By the start of the 2000s, most funding was from governments,
as opposed to the faith-based funds that started the programme in 1984.
A website went online in 2006 while a reference centre containing the
extensive collection of photographs and documentation was established in
TBC’s main office in Bangkok. In 2004, TBC became registered as a charity
in the UK under the name, the Thailand Burma Border Consortium.
Camp Governance
The long history of the camps is one marked by cooperation, equal partnership,
and mutual respect. Relationships among refugees, between camp committees
and refugee committees, and between aid agencies, including TBC, and
the refugee community have become stronger and more durable as
challenges have been faced together. In fact, the ups and downs of camp
life, including the aforementioned cross-border attacks by the DKBA and
SLORC troops, ration cuts due to a reduction in donor funding, the challenges
of resettlement, ensuring social cohesion, fading hopes in a permanent
political solution to the conflict, and adapting to a modern, digitised world,
have been dealt with because of the strength of relationships between
refugee communities and TBC, forged over decades. There is a real sense of
community in the camps, with a democratic and accountable leadership in the
form of refugee committees and camp committees. This section will highlight
some of the ways this has occurred, bringing to light the remarkable capacity
and organisation of the refugee communities themselves, and how TBC has
worked to support them.
The Karen, Karenni, and Mon Refugee Committees are the main
coordinating body for the refugees, liaising with NGOs that provide assistance,
the UNHCR and the Thai authorities. The 15 members of the largest –
KRC – were initially selected based on Community Elder’s Advisory Boards’
recommendations (8 members), who also provide guidance to the Refugee
Committees, and seven representatives from the camp committees. Each
camp has its own camp committee which is involved in the day-to-day
running of the administration and management of camps. They consist of
an executive committee and various subcommittees that deal with issues
such as supplies, health, education, camp affairs, justice, and security.
Decentralised further, there are section or zone committees with a similar
structure to the camp committees. There are also ten-household
representatives, mirroring the structure inside Myanmar.
Furthermore, as with other aspects of camp life, the committees evolved
and adapted to a changing context and selection has become more democratic
over the years, with all members selected subsequent to a more
democratic process. In 1998, the Karen Refugee Committee revised its
Constitution and held elections to make the committee more representative
and TBC helped with capacity-building sessions. TBC has continued to
support such grassroots democracy and in 2013, TBC worked with the Karen
Refugee Committee and the Karenni Refugee Committee (KnRC) to write a
new suite of guidelines for the elections which helped ensure stronger rep-
resentation for women, establish procedures for a secret ballot, and
involve the participation of unregistered refugees. TBC helped administer
the elections, provided materials and support for election promotion, and
TBC staff acted as election observers for all polling processes. Out of the
15 new KRC committee members in 2013, seven were women (an increase
from 20 to 46 per cent) while the KnRC included a provision that a minimum
of 30% of candidates must be women.
This short explanation does not cover the complexity and scale of administration
and governance in the camps, but it gives an idea of the very high levels of
structure and organisation that the refugees themselves have established.
This community-based camp management model has underwritten TBC’s
approach to ensure rights of refugees to self-determination and dignity despite
displacement, and has been since day one. It is unique, and enables refugees
to participate in decision making, programme design and implementation
and contributing to the longer term vision of self-reliance
Growth and Adaptation
Yet times changed and throughout the 1990s the political developments
in Burma reduced the resources available to Karen authorities, which in
turn meant that they were struggling to cover the costs of administration.
TBC thus allowed the camp committees to keep the used rice sacks and
containers to sell on, the revenue of which would support camp committee
expenses such as stationary, photocopying, torch batteries for night
security patrols, funerals, commemoration days, festivals, travel costs to
town, entertainment of visitors and Thai authorities, and social welfare for
vulnerable families and individuals. These expenses grew naturally as the
camp populations increased, and so TBC started to sell back the rice sacks
themselves and allocate the revenue to the camp committees. By 2000,
70% of the credit received was given to the camp committees for such
administration costs. However, in an example of growing together, new
donor requirements in terms of procurement eventually led to the
introduction of polypropylene rice sacks as oppose to traditional jute sacks.
These new rice sacks had a resale value of just one Thai Baht compared to
20 Thai Baht that the jute sacks had – removing a major source of funding
for the refugee camp committees. Both TBC and the camp committees had
to adapt, and they did so together. TBC began, in 2002, to include camp
administration costs as a budget line based on six monthly operating
expense budgets drawn up by the camp committees, with volunteer
stipends paid that were commensurate that the health and education NGOs
would pay refugee volunteers. As ever, this was designed and implemented
with the trust and cooperation between the refugees and TBC.
One of the challenges that the refugee authorities have faced is the growing
ethnic diversity of the camp populations. The first refugees were almost all
Karen, and Mon and Karenni camps were set up after 1990 although the
Mon camps were relocated back to Burma in the 1990s (Mon refugees do
remain living in the camps in Thailand, but form a minority). The post-1988
demonstrations brought ethnic Burman students from the cities, while
trickles of other ethnic groups continued to arrive in the 1990s and 2000s.
Especially after 2005, the ethnic make-up of the camps began to diversify.
The Karen were still by far the most populous but as camps became less
ethnically homogenous, the camp authorities took measures to ensure
diverse representation and inclusivity. The KRC and the Mae La Camp
Committee in 2010 established the Coordinating Committee for Ethnic
Groups and a Camp Committee Advisory Board which included
representatives of various religious and ethnicities that lived in the camp.
Both of these bodies worked closely with the main camp committee in
coordinating, planning and implementing activities. For example, ethnic
minority representatives were included in Mae La’s nine-member New
Arrivals Committee, which was responsible for verifying new arrivals.
Muslim representatives were part of various committees in Mae La and
Umphiem Mai such as Code of Conduct, Boarding House and Livelihoods
Committees. This commitment to inclusivity and diverse representation is
even more remarkable given at the time the Thai policy was that new
arrivals were not being registered with the Thai MOI and unregistered
refugees were not allowed to take positions of authority or work in education
and health services. These pro-active and creative steps demonstrate
a commitment to ensuring inclusivity of the camp authorities so that
ethnic minorities become part of the camp community.
TBC has also supported several initiatives as part of its programme to
ensure this ethnic diversity. An important step towards this was the
recruitment of a community liaison officer in 2005 (renamed community
outreach officer in 2009), tasked initially with meeting with and mapping
community organisations in the camps so as to address ethnic, gender,
and other inequalities in representation and participation in camp life.
Almost immediately this led to more inclusive and better feedback towards
TBC programming which was promptly acted on. The changes brought
about may not appear to be major, but the small improvements such as
better choice of mosquito nets, or delivery of salt once a month rather
than every 2-3 months due to bags splitting, are nevertheless important
aspects of daily life in the camps. In another example, for the Muslim
community, based on community feedback, rations were adjusted so that
a halal alternative, in the form of beans, was offered instead of the typical
fishpaste. Various other methods of outreach, communication and feedback
have been implemented to ensure that TBC is sensitive to the diverse
needs of the camps, and to target those who may be vulnerable or
potentially marginalised. Public forums, community consultations,
communication points, and comment boxes have all been useful at various
points. Partnership with the Karen Student Network Group, who established
a radio programme for the camps in the late 1990s, has been an effective
communication channel, for example to broadcast changes to the food
basket. Refugees want to be making decisions about their own lives, and
the more that TBC has been able to connect, receive feedback and act on
these suggestions, the more smoothly the programme runs, the more
effective the various projects are, and most importantly, the refugees
themselves play an active role in the running of the camps.
The partnership with community based and civil-society organisations who
are staffed by refugees themselves play a crucial role in complementing the
work of the refugee and camp committees, providing social welfare, organising
activities, advocating for the advancement of human rights, or playing a
protection role. Women’s groups, such as the Karen Women’s Organisation,
the Karenni Women’s Organisation or the Muslim Women’s Association
have been instrumental in promoting and protecting women’s rights and
ensuring that gender perspectives are included in both camp administra-
tion and TBC programming. TBC has been happy to support such groups
for many years in terms of core support for basic materials, administrative
costs, and project management.
Resettlement
In 2005, the Thai Government gave permission to allow for the resettle-
ment of refugees from the camps to third countries. While some refugees,
classed as ‘persons of concern’ were already being accepted by the US
in 2004, the resettlement programme was a significant development in
the history of the camps. Only those registered in the 2004/5 registration
process were allowed to resettle. Initially the US stated they would accept
9,000 refugees, which was initially thought of as taking in the entire population
of Tham Hin Camp, and if not all residents took up the offer, the balance
would be offered to refugees in other camps. Other countries, namely
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Sweden, and the UK stated their willingness to accept a further
3000-4000 between them. Refugees would register their interest with
UNHCR, who would then pass on their information to the foreign missions
of the receiving countries to process the said applications. By the end of
the first year, 2005, UNHCR reported that it had received applications from
4,651 families representing 24,054 persons, or around 24% of the total
registered population of 101,912 persons
The resettlement programme soon expanded, and the US began accepting
refugees from all the camps. The initial departures for the US hit a snag
early on, and this is related to US legislation which banned entry to anyone
who had given “material support” to an armed opposition group, and this
was applied to anyone who had supported the Karen National Union. How-
ever, eventually a ‘waiver’ was passed and processing began in earnest.
From 2007 the US began accepting refugees from more camps and with
no ceiling figure.
As the programme got under way, 4,789 refugees left Thailand for resettle-
ment in 2006, 14,636 in 2007, and 17,172 in 2008. These numbers contin-
ued to increase until 2009, after which they began to reduce. The reason
being that with only those who were registered eligible for resettlement,
the pool of those who could apply was diminishing. The majority of these
departures – around three quarters – went to the United States. The
following shows resettlement numbers by 2011.
2011–2018 A Time of Hope? A New Myanmar?
Leading up to the years that were labelled the ‘democratic transition’
decade of 2011 to 2021, there was little expectation that the status quo –
of entrenchment of the power of the Tatmadaw14 of ongoing armed conflict,
and the repression of human rights – would change in any meaningful way.
Political developments leading up to 2011 included the promulgation of the
2008 Constitution that ostensibly allowed for democratic elections. Yet the
public vote that approved this new structure of governance was implausibly
supported by over 90% of the population during a referendum that was
conducted in the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis – a disaster that
killed upwards of 150,000 people and devastated large swathes of lower
Myanmar. This 2008 Constitution reserves key ministry posts for military
personnel, while guaranteeing 25% of parliamentary seats for the military.
Furthermore, with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi still in prison and therefore not
allowed to run in the election, the military-created, military-backed party –
the USDP – took power in the new Parliament with an overwhelming victory
in the 2010 election. Thus, while political changes were afoot, and there
had to be hope, expectations were not particularly high that conflict would
turn to peace and refugees could return home.
And yet.
A series of surprising and dramatic developments in the coming years
forged a sense of optimism. Indeed the atmosphere surrounding Burma/
Myanmar for many observers from around 2011 to 2013 could be described
as heady. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was released, a huge controversial dam
project that would have serious socio-economic and cultural impacts on
local populations in Kachin State – the Myitsone Dam – was suspended,
media restrictions was loosened, labour laws allowing the formation of
trade unions were passed, and hundreds of political prisoners were
released. In 2012 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League
for Democracy that won a landslide in the 1990 elections, entered and won
by-elections. Perhaps most importantly for the refugees, ceasefires with
non-state ethnic armed organisations were signed throughout the country,
including in January 2012 between the Burma/Myanmar government, the
military, and the KNU. And while doubts over the reforms remained –
including the outbreak of conflict with the Kachin Independence Army in
the north from June 2011 and the enduring institutional role of the
military in politics – the international community responded with gusto.
Most economic sanctions were lifted, international organisations such as
the World Bank reengaged, NGOs and UN agencies entered the country in
their droves, and major international politicians paid visit to the country,
meeting ‘reformist’ President, Thein Sein, and newly released democratic
opposition leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
TBC’s strategic direction and programmes reflected this change, but as with
all TBC’s programmes, the refugee communities and their representatives
displayed agency and organisation in preparing themselves for a possible
return, while also raising concerns. Moreover, the support for many years
that TBC had provided the refugees and their leaders, in terms of trainings,
capacity-building, and resources, had equipped them with the skills and
experience to become efficient, successful, and respected leaders and
prepare them for their role in the community if they were to relocate to
southeastern Myanmar. The skills and coping strategies learnt over many
years were hopefully going to be crucial in playing a constructive role in
rebuilding their communities in the southeast.
Preparing for Return
For TBC, and for the refugee communities then, the years from 2011 to
2015 were particularly hopeful. Indeed from 2012 refugee numbers began
to reduce. TBC’s ‘verified caseload’ fell by almost 9,000 people during 2012
to 128,199, the lowest number in a decade. They continued to lower and
new arrivals noticeably dropped off, while a significant number of refugees
spontaneously returned to Burma/Myanmar. It was thus decided early on
that there needed to be a readiness for organised refugee return while
at the same time it was acknowledged that the conditions for large-scale
return were not yet right. The increasing militarisation by the Tatmadaw in
southeastern Burma/Myanmar after the ceasefire as they sought to fortify
existing bases and control roads were clear warning signs of the difficulties
of moving from a ceasefire to a sustainable peace. But there existed, for the
first time in nearly 30 years, an opportunity for many refugees to start
thinking about home. A 2012 TBC report reflects the optimism of the time,
“this is a once in a lifetime opportunity to end conflict, bring about reconciliation
and allow Burma/ Myanmar to emerge from isolation. It is important to
wholeheartedly support and encourage the change.”
Early on, in 2012, the UNHCR drafted a framework, later to become a roadmap,
for voluntary return of refugees from Thailand to Burma/Myanmar. However,
first and foremost, the refugee community had to have access to information
in order make informed decision on any return. TBC saw the absolute necessity
in supporting refugees’ work in gathering and assessing information,
exploring options for the future, and making decisions and plans. This
happened in various ways such as: support to the CCSDPT in setting up
information centres; assisting the KRC and KnRC to develop return guide-
lines and to put operational plans for return in place; and organising
refugee leaders to participate in ‘go and see’ visits to Burma/Myanmar to
gather information on conditions inside the country and possible return sites.
Meanwhile the refugee committees themselves established the Karenni
Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction Working Group and the Committee
for Refugee Return to lead efforts on preparedness and return planning.
Simultaneously, in the years leading up to 2013, resettlement was decreasing.
With numbers dwindling, the US announced in 2013 the phasing out of the
resettlement programme, although refugees still in the pipeline continued
to leave while UNHCR continued to identify refugees for resettlement for
reasons of family unit, family reunification, protection and medical cases.
Yet it was not just on the Thai side of the border in the refugee camps
where TBC felt it could make positive change. In order to support the
broader peace process and positive political developments, TBC began to
become more operational inside Burma/Myanmar. A first official meeting with
the Government of Myanmar was held in Bangkok in early 2012, where TBC
were thanked for the support provided to refugees over the years. Subsequently,
TBC made an official visit to Yangon in 2012 and met with Minister Aung
Min, who at the time was the leading figure from the Burma/Myanmar
government in peace negotiations, to discuss establishing programmes inside
the country.17 The Karen Refugee Committee also met with the Karen State
Minister of the Burma/Myanmar government in 2014. Subsequently TBC
supported many CBO-led several programmes to aid in the recovery of
conflict-affected communities in southeastern Burma/Myanmar in light of
possible return of refugees to these areas. TBC sub-offices in Mawlamyine
in Mon State and Loikaw in Kayah State were opened in 2014.
Funding Reductions and joint TBC-Refugee Solutions
Paradoxically, the positive momentum for change did have negative impacts
on the lives of refugees. Many donors sought to establish a foothold inside
the country and, understandably, support the tentative changes towards
democracy. However, this meant that refugee camps in Thailand were pushed
down the priority list and finding adequate funding became a major problem
for TBC. Indeed, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during her visit to Mae La Camp in
2012 warned against fatigue and urged donors to continue to show compassion
and support refugees until they are able to return home. Yet as massive
funding cuts began to take hold, this reduced the ability of TBC to support
the refugee camps and cuts had to be made in various aspects of programming.
Internal restructuring from 2014 meant that staffing numbers decreased
at all levels by up to 20%. In 2017 TBC had to end food support to the five
Karen and Shan camps that were located adjacent to Thailand inside Burma/
Myanmar.
One of the biggest changes was the reduction of food rations for refugees.
Starting in 2013, a reduction in the standard monthly ration alongside
the introduction of need-based ration categories, which saw ration levels
maintained for children, vulnerable households, and increases in monthly
rice rations for households deemed “most vulnerable,” was established.
This community-managed targeting (CMT) system – the first of its kind
in Asia – recognised that over the years refugees had developed their
own coping strategies and some, albeit a very small number (495 out of
118,917 refugees across the nine camps in 2014), were able to be self-
reliant. It was thus essential that those most vulnerable and who were
not self-reliant were still receiving the necessary rations. The introduction
of this CMT programme and its relative success was not possible without
the engagement of refugee communities in defining the criteria for ration
allocation and classification of what constitutes vulnerable. And while
reducing rations amidst strained circumstances is not an inherent good,
the CMT programme did have some benefits. It gave a more direct role
in the management of targeted food needs in the hands of the refugees
themselves while also drawing attention to the specific needs of the most
vulnerable refugees living in the camps.
It was of course not without problems and a reduction in support is
inevitably a difficult process. For example, the reduction in food did catalyse
anxiety in the camps that refugees would be forced to return to Burma/
Myanmar, even if they felt the time was not yet right. There were concerns
that creating categories for food assistance would create divisions between
groups of refugees, while those who earned a stipend as camp workers, and
thus deemed self-reliant, would perhaps have less motivation to work as it
ultimately meant that they would have their food ration reduced. This actually
resulted in two protests in Nu Po Camp in 2014, by teachers and medical
staff. TBC worked hard with refugee and camp committees to ensure
transparent communications, to supplement rations where it was felt to
be an unfair reduction, and establishing an appeal process which was vital
in providing a channel to address grievances. Furthermore, working with
and giving as much support as possible to the camp committees and the
CMT teams in the camps was essential as refugees look up to them when
needing help to deal with their various difficulties faced in camp life. One
example of this is, following the teacher strike event and protest, the Nu Po
Camp Committee decided to address the threat to discontinued education
to children by providing extra rice to the teachers from their own adminis-
trative budget, thus speedily addressing an emergency situation. Indeed, in
2015, when further cuts to funding were made, the refugee-managed CMT
was prepared for the necessary adjustments and resolution.
In 2016 the provision of food rations entered a new phase with the piloting
of a Food Card System in Tham Hin and Nu Po Camps. Under this system
refugees were provided e-vouchers, now food cards, which give households
the opportunity to buy food from designated stores, primarily run by other
refugees, within camp markets, giving them more control and the ability to
expand their food choices. The Food Card System also introduced refugees
to buying goods and services in the modern digital world. The CMT committees,
which are established in each camp, determines the amount food card sup-
port offered to each household. The pilot was successful and was extended
to all the camps in 2019. Not only does the Food Card System give refugees
experience in digital technology, but the dignity of having choice and agen-
cy to make decisions that work best for each household, buying at a time
that is convenient from a larger selection of items and based on individual
preferences fits the ethos of TBC and the community-management of the
camps. Quarterly surveys show that refugees use the card to buy more
expensive items such as rice and cooking oil, and then supplement this with
home grown vegetables from community or home gardens. An external
evaluation found that it had diversified options for livelihoods, improved
diet diversity and supported agriculture productivity.
Hopes Dashed
After the initial years of optimism, mixed signals from home revealed the
fractured nature of political change in Burma/Myanmar. There were
undoubtedly positive developments such as, in 2015, the first, mostly free
and fair election in 25 years, which Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s NLD party won
by a landslide. Peace negotiations continued and in 2015, the nationwide
ceasefire agreement was signed which reinforced the already existing
bilateral ceasefires with, among others, the KNU. International engagement
also increased for a while. However, warning signs were there, particularly
the spread of anti-Muslim violence in central parts of Burma/Myanmar,
growing religious intolerance catalysed by an extremist nationalist Buddhist
movement, and ongoing armed conflict in Kachin and Shan States. Importantly
for many of the refugees who fled from southeastern Burma/Myanmar,
increasing militarisation was putting obstacles in the way of return.
Indeed, research conducted by TBC published in 2014 documented similar
or increased troop strength for both Tatmadaw and ethnic armed groups
across 70% of village tracts in 2014 compared to before the bilateral ceasefire
agreements. Furthermore, while forced labour and active armed conflict
had decreased, land grabbing and other development-induced human
rights violations were becoming more widespread.
The ceasefires were simply not turning into a more sustainable peace.
Yet probably the most dramatic development was the extreme violence
committed by the Tatmadaw against the Muslim minority Rohingya group
in Rakhine State, western Myanmar in 2016 and 2017. The 2017 violence
resulted in over 700,000 Rohingya fleeing into Bangladesh in what the UN
at the time described as a ‘textbook example of ethnic cleansing.’ In 2018,
the International Criminal Court announced that crimes against humanity
would be investigated and a case was opened at the International Court
of Justice. A 2018 report by the UN-established Independent International
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar concluded with the recommendation for
Burma/Myanmar’s top military generals to be investigated for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. After 2017, international diplomatic
relations with the Burma/Myanmar government cooled, the media narrative
began to shift towards some of the deep-seated and unaddressed problems
in the country, and hope for a democratic transition was stalling. For south-
eastern Burma/Myanmar, deterioration in relations with KNU due to the
Tatmadaw’s militarisation and ceasefire violations, as well as the lack of
progress in the national peace process, led a breakdown of the ceasefire in
October 2018, with the KNU suspending formal dialogue. For refugees, this
ultimately meant that prospects of return diminished. Research that TBC
conducted with the Geneva-based International Displacement Monitoring
Centre concluded in 2019 that “donor expectations regarding refugee return
have not been met and recommended adjustments in strategic thinking to
strengthen responses along the entire displacement continuum.”23
The Two Cs – COVID and Coup
Very few people, whether refugees or TBC, could have predicted the dramatic events of 2020-2021, both globally and within Myanmar.
When thinking about the onset of the COVID pandemic in 2019/2020, a
situation far worse than the 2009 planning anticipated, how do refugee
camps, where thousands of people living in close quarters with movements
restricted, deal with the rapid spread of the fatal virus? In the refugee
camps in Thailand, it was through adaption, cooperation, self-reliance, and
mutual trust and learning, principles that have underwritten the history
of camp management and organisation since 1984.
As the COVID-19 pandemic spread rapidly throughout the world, Thailand
declared a state of emergency in 2020, inter-provincial travel was largely
prevented, entry into Thailand’s borders was heavily restricted and with
quarantine for new arrivals set up, shops, bars and entertainment business-
es were closed, and face masks became mandatory. Thailand’s initial
strict response meant that in 2020, the rate of COVID-19 infection was
comparatively low. Meanwhile, the UNHCR stopped the voluntary
repatriation process from February 2020.
TBC, as with many organisations in all sectors throughout the world,
switched to remote communications, ensuring that information flows and
exchange with camp-based staff were timely and accurate. Additional
measures that TBC employed included the suspension of mass gatherings,
non-essential travel to camps halted, personal protective equipment dis-
tributed, hand-washing and hygiene stations set up in all camps, quarantine
centres established, and information about the pandemic and prevention
measures disseminated with local partners. Strict enforcement of move-
ment of refugees outside the camp by the Thai government meant that
income generation activities were impacted. This affected the ability of
many households to acquire the adequate food amounts and anxiety within
the camps increased. In response, TBC increased the value of the food car
so that every household was receiving the level of those in the ‘Most Vulnerable’
category. Furthermore, the switch to remote communications, and the
decreased physical presence of TBC staff meant that camp committees
took even greater responsibility and ownership over the management of
assistance. Due to the swift response and measures taken together with the
refugee and camp committees, only one case was discovered in the refugee
camps in 2020, a mass outbreak was initially avoided, and core humanitarian
assistance continued to be delivered.
Inside Myanmar, the resilience of local communities, especially ethnic
service providers and ethnic armed organisations was paramount to the
pandemic response, as decades of underfunded healthcare and a legacy of
armed conflict meant that Myanmar state provision was not going to meet
the local needs. Thus, ethnic service providers established and operated
screening checkpoints and enforced community-based quarantines despite
increasing militarisation from the Tatmadaw. For TBC, the transition to
online meetings and trainings meant that programmes stayed on track.
Furthermore, to support local response to the pandemic inside Myanmar,
TBC used a four pronged strategy: risk prevention communication and
community engagement; distribution of PPE; supporting CSOs who worked
at screening points; and more targeted distribution of food assistance and
cash transfers.
In 2021, however, the preparedness that camp committees and TBC
had been working together on became very much in need. A rise in COVID
infections in Thailand that began in April 2021 and peaked in August spread
to the camps, and eight camps experienced such an outbreak, with over
3,000 cases recorded and 36 deaths by the end of 2021. Yet throughout the
2nd half of the year, the vaccination programme began to reach refugees
and nearly one quarter had received at least one shot by the end of 2021.
TBC had to initially work hard to overcome some vaccine hesitancy, with
videos of senior camp leaders receiving their vaccination and combatting
misinformation shown, while camp information teams also disseminated
accurate information and combatted falsehoods.
Following worldwide trends, Thailand gradually reduced COVID
restrictions throughout 2022, and the state of emergency was lifted,
international travel resumed and mask-wearing was no longer mandatory.
For refugees, they were better able to seek local employment opportunities
outside the camps although new arrivals were still not technically allowed.
TBC continued to support vaccinations in camps. And although in-person
meetings began to be more possible, the benefits of remote communication,
such as increased attendance resulting in more inclusive participation from
different groups, means that some of these measures were adopted on a
more permanent basis. Unlike many environments in the world, however, the anxiety, concerns,and changes in day-to-day life that the COVID-19 pandemic catalysed was
compounded by a sudden and violent political upheaval across the border
in Myanmar.
Coup
February 1st, 2021 is a day that has changed Myanmar forever. Alleging
election fraud after the NLD won its second landslide election in November
2020, and just as the government was about to take office, the Tatmadaw
staged a coup. Tanks were on the street, State Counsellor, Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi, President U Win Myint and many other NLD MPs, ministers, and
political figures were arrested, and internet was cut. Min Aung Hlaing, the
Commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Armed Forces, formed the military’s
new body, the State Administration Council, to attempt to govern the
country.
The response from the people of Myanmar was an emphatic ‘no!’.
Huge street demonstrations throughout the country, the formation of a mass
Civil Disobedience Movement in which public and private sectorworkers
went on strike, boycotts of products produced by military conglomerates,
refusal to pay bills and other forms of protest and non-cooperation
proliferated. The response of the newly formed SAC to this nationwide
resistance to the coup was violent and brutal. Mass arrests, massacres in
the streets, internet cuts, and instigation of violence by released prisoners,
forced many protesters to take refuge in ethnic armed organisations
administrative areas. A coalition of civil society organisations, EAOs, and
political parties formed a political alliance – the National Unity Consultative
Council, which in turn formed the National Unity Government, consisting
of former NLD members and ethnic leaders.
Armed conflict dramatically increased, both with long-established
EAOs such as the KNU, and also newly formed people’s defence forces
(PDFs) that sprung up in response to the coup. SAC attacks in the southeast,
including the use of heavy artillery and airstrikes were particularly fierce,
targeting groups opposing the coup and displacing 200,000 by the end of
2021. One particular offensive against Lay Kay Kaw in December 2021 along
the Thailand border near Mae Sot, which was supposed to be a site for
internally displaced persons to return to, decimated the town, and caused
thousands to flee over to Thailand. Restrictions by the Thai government
meant that access was only allowed for Thai organisations. TBC managed to
leverage local networks to provide emergency support but after six weeks,
these refugees were sent back to Myanmar.
As the junta ramped up its attacks throughout the country, the Delta
variant of COVID-19 tore through the country in the rainy season months of
2021. The dysfunction of the health services that the coup caused meant
that vaccines, testing, and treatment was decimated. Oxygen was being
hoarded by the junta for SAC personnel, medical workers arrested for
supporting the CDM, and the junta refused to allow non-state medical
services such as private clinics and INGOs to operate. Ethnic health service
providers did their best to fill the gap but still, thousands were dying,
crematoriums were full and an extreme public health emergency was
compounding the extreme violence faced by people throughout the country.
Yet the resistance in Myanmar has continued undeterred. In fact
the governance abilities, as well as territories controlled, has expanded
and continues to expand. The SAC has resorted increasingly to more violent
measures, with airstrikes particularly prevalent as the junta faces losses on
the ground, defections, and low morale. In fact, several airstrikes and heavy
artillery attacks landed on Thai soil in 2022, and the Myanmar Air Force
violated Thai airspace.
Inside Myanmar, TBC continues to provide emergency relief in the form
of cash transfers, food aid, non-food items and/or medical treatment, which
in 2022 was coordinated for 260,000 civilians. This low-profile, community-
driven response, has been supported via a network of over 30 civil
society organisations (CSOs) and ethnic service providers across southeast-
ern Myanmar. Indeed, informal, local, cross-border and ethnic service
providers that TBC partners with are able to provide support to far more
IDPs than the formal humanitarian architecture that goes through SAC
controlled areas.
For refugees and the assistance programme, uncertainty prevails. The coup
and subsequent violence means that prospects for return, already dimming
by 2020, have become extremely low, at least in the short-term. Plans for
return including the UNHCR-facilitated voluntarily return programme have
been suspended indefinitely, as have ‘go and see’ visits. The sounds of
airstrikes and heavy artillery are heard from the border and refugee camps,
underscoring the dramatic escalation of violence inside the country since
February 2021, and the lack of immediate hope for return
Conclusion
Donors have been supporting refugees in the Thai camps for forty years,
and the Thai government has simultaneously hosted these communities with
generosity for these same four decades. While there have been ups and
downs along the way, there is unfortunately a continued need for this sup-
port. However, this support is not without return. Not only have there been
successes in terms of the incredible resiliency and organisation that refugees
have shown, but they are well prepared to contribute to society. Indeed
refugees have been doing so despite their predicament, whether those who
resettled overseas, those few who did return to Myanmar and work among
their communities, or the joint projects between refugees and local Thai
villages.
The situation in Myanmar is uncertain, violent, and riddled with anxiety. Yet
there is a hope in the country, and there must be hope for a dignified and
durable solution for these refugee communities. The goodwill and capacity
built over forty years is crucial to maintain and to protect what is a unique
model of refugee organisation in order to contribute for any future for
refugee communities. It is imperative for those who have been supporting
these vibrant communities to continue to support the self-reliance, social
cohesion, diversity and organisation that can be part of the building of a new
Myanmar, or adding value, diversity and social capital to where the refugees
ultimately end up. The support from donors and the Thai government has
been an investment in humanity and in this time of hope for a better future
coupled with anxiety about the current situation, TBC is prepared and will
continue to work with the same principles that began forty years ago, in
1984.
This is adapted from TBCs report ‘40 Years: Working together with displaced communities on the Thai Myanmar border’ that was published to mark our 40 year anniversary. For more details on TBC history and journey please refer to the report.
Photos by Ian Taylor – Development Photographer